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Hutchings*
This article reviews through a three-part format the role and efficacy of the
Species at Risk Act (SARA) in trying to save SARA-listed inner Bay of Fundy (iBoF)
Atlantic salmon and other Atlantic salmon populations at risk from the brink of
extinction. The cascade of SARA promises is first discussed, including: the independent assessment of the status of the species based on best available scientific information; the protection of listed species, their residences and critical habitat; and
the two-stage recovery planning process. The trickles of protection actually delivered by SARA in relation to Atlantic salmon are next described, including the recent adoption of a Recovery Strategy and identification of critical freshwater
habitat. The sea of challenges in implementing SARA and in strengthening the protective net outside SARA is finally highlighted. Particular challenges include: overcoming the slow implementation of the Act; addressing scientific limitations of the
Recovery Strategy; forging a clear agenda for recovery actions; confronting limitations in incidental harm permitting; protecting critical habitat; getting a grip on
protection and recovery of other Atlantic salmon populations at risk; bolstering
environmental assessment; enhancing provincial engagement in recovery efforts;
ensuring full implementation of Canada’s Oceans Act; and charting future directions for the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization.

Dans cet article, l’auteur examine, à l’aide d’une analyse en trois parties, le
rôle et l’efficacité de la Loi sur les espèces en péril (la Loi) en ce qui concerne la
conservation du saumon de l’Atlantique de l’intérieur de la baie de Fundy inscrite
sur la Liste des espèces en péril de la Loi ainsi que d’autres populations de
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saumons qui sont en voie d’extinction. Tout d’abord, l’article présente les
promesses contenues dans la Loi, incluant : l’évaluation indépendante du statut des
espèces sur la base des meilleures informations scientifiques disponibles; la protection des espèces se trouvant sur la liste, de leur résidence et de leurs habitats
essentiels et le processus de planification du rétablissement en deux étapes. Le peu
de protection accordée dans les faits par la Loi relativement aux saumons de
l’Atlantique est ensuite décrit, incluant la mise en place récente d’un programme
de rétablissement et d’identification des habitats essentiels d’eau douce. Finalement, l’auteur discute de la multitude de défis présentés par la mise en œuvre de la
Loi et par le renforcement de la protection offerte au-delà de la Loi. Certains défis
consistent notamment à : surmonter la lenteur de la mise en œuvre de la Loi;
résoudre les limitations scientifiques du programme de rétablissement; établir un
échéancier précis pour les actions relatives au rétablissement; faire face aux
permis pour dommages fortuits; protéger les habitats essentiels; prendre en main
la protection et le rétablissement des autres populations de saumon de l’Atlantique
qui sont en péril; améliorer l’évaluation environnementale; bonifier l’engagement
des provinces relativement aux efforts de rétablissement; assurer la mise en œuvre
complète de la Loi sur les océans du Canada; et établir les orientations futures de
la North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization.

1. INTRODUCTION
Although Atlantic salmon was once an important commercial and recreational
fishery, a spiritual component of traditional Aboriginal family and community,1
and a centrepiece for thriving ecosystems,2 today salmon populations are severely
depressed and extirpated from many river systems in Europe and North America.3
By 1970, the species’ production capacity had been reduced to 32 per cent of its
estimated original productivity.4 Since 1970, salmon abundance has declined dramatically, and today stands at the lowest level known in history.5 According to a
2001 assessment, salmon have become extinct in 84 per cent of American rivers,
and are critically endangered in the remaining 16 per cent.6
While Canada’s prospects seem less bleak with several rivers containing
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6

Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Recovery Strategy for the Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar),
inner Bay of Fundy Populations [Final] (Ottawa: Fisheries and Oceans, 2010) [hereafter Recovery Strategy] at 17; WWF, The Status of Wild Atlantic Salmon: a River by
River
Assessment
(WWF,
2001),
online:
WWF
<http://assets.panda.org/downloads/salmon2.pdf>, at 1-2.
Recovery Strategy, ibid. at 17; and WWF, ibid. at 1-2.
WWF, ibid. at 2; COSEWIC, COSEWIC Assessment and Update Status Report on the
Atlantic Salmon Salmo salar (Inner Bay of Fundy populations) in Canada (Ottawa:
Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada, 2006) at 14, online: SARA
Public Registry <www.sararegistry.gc.ca/status/status_e.cfm>.
Fred Whoriskey, “Management Angels and Demons in the Conservation of the Atlantic
Salmon in North America” (2009) 70 American Fisheries Society Symposium 1083 at
1086.
WWF, supra note 1 at 2; Whoriskey, ibid. at 1086.
WWF, ibid. at 7.
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healthy salmon populations, particularly in the northern range of the Canadian distribution, most Canadian salmon populations appear to be in various stages of decline.7 From 15 conservation units of anadromous Atlantic salmon reviewed by the
Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada (COSEWIC) in Eastern
Canada,8 five have been assessed as endangered;9 one threatened;10 four are of
special concern;11 four are not at risk;12 and one population is considered to be data
deficient.13
Among the populations at risk, the most serious is undoubtedly the case of
inner Bay of Fundy (iBoF) Atlantic salmon. While the historical total abundance of
iBoF Atlantic salmon has been estimated to likely have exceeded 40,000 adults
earlier in the 20th century, there were less than 500 adults in 1998, less than 250 in
1999, and fewer than 100 in 2003.14 Analyses of data from two index rivers show
an abundance decline between 1967 and 2000 of 99 per cent and between 92 per
cent and 97 per cent, respectively.15 Most of the decline has occurred in the early
and mid-1990s.16 Population projections under current conditions indicate a very
high probability that, without human intervention, iBoF salmon in those index rivers will be extinct by 2012 and 2016, respectively.17 Extirpation had already been
occurring in some rivers. Records of recreational catch indicate that 32 rivers
within this region contained self-sustaining Atlantic salmon populations, another 10
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WWF, ibid. at 84.
COSEWIC, COSEWIC status report on Atlantic salmon Salmo salar (anadromous
form) in Canada (Ottawa: Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada,
2011) [in press]. Some populations of Atlantic salmon complete their entire life cycle
in freshwater. They are known as landlocked populations. COSEWIC has reviewed
only one purportedly landlocked designatable unit in Canada, the Lake Ontario, assessing it as extinct.
Inner Bay of Fundy; Anticosti Island population; Eastern Cape Breton population;
Nova Scotia Southern Upland population; and Outer Bay of Fundy population
(COSEWIC, ibid.).
South Newfoundland population (COSEWIC, ibid.).
Inner St. Lawrence population; Gaspe-Sothern Gulf of St. Lawrence population; Quebec Eastern North Shore population; and Quebec Western North Shore population
(COSEWIC, ibid.).
Southwest Newfoundland population, Northwest Newfoundland population, Labrador
population and Northeast Newfoundland population (COSEWIC, ibid.).
Nunavut population (COSEWIC, ibid.).
COSEWIC, supra note 3 at 27; Peter Amiro, Population Status of Inner Bay of Fundy
Atlantic Salmon (Salmo salar) to 1999, Can. Tech. Rep. Fish. Aquat. Sci. No. 2488
(2003).
Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Recovery Potential Assessment for Inner Bay of Fundy
Atlantic Salmon, DFO Can. Sci. Advis. Sec. Sci. Advis. Rep. 2008/050 (Dartmouth,
NS: DFO Maritimes, 2008) [hereafter Recovery Potential Assessment], at 5. The two
index rivers are the Stewiacke River, Nova Scotia, and the Big Salmon River, New
Brunswick.
Ibid.
Ibid. at 8.
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rivers and streams are reported to have produced salmon, and additional rivers are
suspected to have contained salmon.18 However, juvenile surveys undertaken between 2000 and 2002 in 36 and 43 iBoF rivers, respectively, showed that juvenile
Atlantic salmon were absent in nearly half of the rivers.19
With iBoF Atlantic salmon listed as endangered in Schedule 1 when the Canada’s Species at Risk Act20 (SARA) was enacted in 2002, and further salmon populations facing possible SARA listing, this article reviews through a three-part format the role and efficacy of SARA in trying to save salmon from the brink of
extinction. Part 2 summarizes the cascade of SARA promises to protect species at
risk, including prohibitions on taking endangered or threatened species and mandating the development of recovery strategies and action plans. Part 3 highlights the
trickles of protection actually delivered by SARA in relation to Atlantic salmon,
with a Recovery Strategy and identification of some critical river habitat being
main accomplishments. Part 4 discusses the sea of challenges confronting the effective protection of Atlantic salmon, including the need to address limitations in
SARA implementation, such as its slow pace, and the need to cast a stronger protective net outside SARA, for example, by fully implementing integrated management planning obligations under Canada’s Ocean Act.21
This article does not explicitly address the statutory review process of SARA
currently underway in the House of Commons, led by the Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development.22 However, a few thoughts regarding SARA
amendment prospects are offered in the Conclusion.

2. SARA AND AQUATIC SPECIES: CASCADE OF PROMISES
The enactment of SARA in 2002 was a major step in Canada’s commitment to
the protection and preservation of Canadian biodiversity. The purposes of the Act
are to prevent wildlife species from being extirpated or becoming extinct; to provide for the recovery of wildlife species extirpated, endangered, or threatened as a
result of human activities; and to manage species of special concern to prevent
them from becoming endangered or threatened.23
SARA provides a cascade of promises to protect Canada’s wildlife biodiversity. Those promises include an independent assessment of the status of the species
based on best available scientific information; the protection of individuals, residences and their critical habitats; a formal and on-going recovery planning process;
environmental assessment for impacts of projects to species at risk; substantial enforcement measures; and encouragement of financial support for recovery
activities.

18
19
20
21
22

23

COSEWIC, supra note 3 at 15-16; Recovery Strategy, supra note 1 at 8-9.
COSEWIC, ibid. at 22; Recovery Strategy, ibid. at 20-21.
S.C. 2002, c. 29 [hereafter SARA].
S.C. 1996, c. 31.
For more information on the SARA Statutory Review Process, see Parliament of Canada, House of Commons, Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development,
online: Parliament of Canada <http://www.parl.gc.ca/common/index.asp>.
SARA, s. 6.
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The first of these promises is the separation of species’ status assessment from
the political decision of listing the species for legal protection. The assessment on
the biological status of the species was entrusted to an independent expert committee — COSEWIC — which makes its decision on the basis of the best scientific
information available, community knowledge and aboriginal traditional knowledge.24 COSEWIC, indeed, had been established in 1977 and had already gained
expertise and credibility in the assessment of wildlife species before SARA entered
into force. The subsequent political decision of listing the species for SARA protection is rendered by the Governor in Council on the recommendation of the Minister
of Environment.25
A second promise of SARA is the immediate protection of listed endangered
species and their residences through the automatic prohibitions included in ss. 32
and 33 of SARA. No person shall kill, harm, harass, capture or take an individual
of a wildlife species that is listed as an extirpated, endangered or threatened species.26 No person shall possess, collect, buy, sell or trade an individual of such
wildlife species.27 No person shall damage or destroy the residence of one or more
individuals of such wildlife species.28 These prohibitions apply automatically on
federal lands, to aquatic species and to migratory birds protected by the Migratory
Birds Convention Act, 1994.29
A third promise of SARA is the protection and restoration of critical habitat.30
A first requirement under SARA, in this respect, is the identification (to the extent
possible) of the species’ critical habitat in the recovery strategies or action plans.31
In addition, SARA offers a powerful, albeit not automatic, protection for identified
critical habitat in s. 58: no person shall destroy any part of the critical habitat of any
listed endangered or threatened species, or of any listed extirpated species if the
recovery strategy has recommended the reintroduction of the species into the wild
in Canada.32
The fourth and perhaps most important promise of SARA lies in the recovery
planning process for individual species or group of species. Recovery planning is a
comprehensive two-stage process ensuring that all measures are adopted and all
actions taken so as to prevent wildlife species from becoming extirpated or extinct,

24
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26
27
28
29
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SARA, ss. 15(2).
SARA, s. 27. Also see: A.Ø. Mooers et al., “Science, Policy and Species at Risk in
Canada” (2010) 60 BioScience 843 at 844-845; David L. VanderZwaag & Jeffrey A.
Hutchings, “Canada’s Marine Species at Risk: Science and Law at the Helm, but a Sea
of Uncertainties” (2005) 36 Ocean Devel. & Int’l L. 219 at 221-22.
SARA, ss. 32(1).
SARA, ss. 32(2).
SARA, s. 33.
S.C. 1994, c. 22.
Loss of habitat is often cited as the main cause of population decline in Canada and
elsewhere. See e.g. Kate Smallwood, A Guide to Canada’s Species at Risk Act (Vancouver, BC; Toronto, ON: Sierra Legal Defence Fund, 2003) at 27, online: Ecojustice
<http://www.ecojustice.ca/publications/reports>.
SARA, ss. 41(1)(c) and 49(1)(a).
SARA, ss. 58(1).

272

JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE

[22 J.E.L.P.]

or to recover wildlife that are extirpated, endangered, or threatened as a result of
human activity. The two-stage process consists of a recovery strategy, which sets
the general framework for recovery of the species,33 and one or more action plans,
which identify the specific measures to implement the recovery strategy.34 The implementation of the recovery strategy and the progress towards meeting its objectives are subject to a mandatory review every five years.35
Another promise of SARA relates to the assessment of potential negative environmental effects of proposed projects on species at risk, and the identification of
possible mitigation measures. The authority responsible for ensuring that an assessment of environmental effects is undertaken under the Canadian Environmental
Assessment Act36 (CEAA) must notify the competent Minister if the project is
likely to affect listed wildlife species or their critical habitat, and ensure that the
effects of the project are avoided or lessened if the project is carried out.37
SARA also provides extensive enforcement powers and measures38 and potentially significant penalties for violators. Fines up to C$1,000,00039 for each individual of one or more species at risk involved in the offence can be imposed,40 and
up to five years of imprisonment.41
Finally, SARA encourages and supports stewardship activities contributing to
the protection and recovery of species at risk and their habitat.42 Various federal
funds have financially supported recovery activities.43

33

34

35

36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

A recovery strategy is required to describe the species and its needs; identify the threats
to the survival of the species and the threats to its habitat; establish scientifically sound
and credible population and distribution objectives that will assist the recovery and
survival of the listed species at risk; identify the critical habitat to the extent possible,
and/or a schedule of studies to undertake that identification; determine which additional information is required about the species; and establish a timeline for the completion of action plan or plans (SARA, s. 41).
An action plan is required to include: an identification of the species critical habitat, to
the extent possible; a statement of the measures that are proposed to be taken to protect
the species critical habitat; an identification of any portion of critical habitat that has
not been protected; a statement on the measures to be taken to implement the recovery
strategy and an indication as to when these measures are to take place; methods to
monitor the recovery of the species; and an evaluation of socio-economic costs of the
action plan and the benefits derived from its implementation (SARA, s. 49).
SARA, s. 46. The implementation of the action plans must also be monitored and assessed five years after plans come into effect (SARA, s. 55). Subsequent monitoring
and reporting obligations are not explicitly considered.
S.C. 1992, c. 37 [hereafter CEAA].
SARA, ss. 79(1) and (2).
SARA, ss. 86–96.
SARA, s. 97.
SARA, s. 97(5).
SARA, s. 97.
SARA, ss. 11 to 13.
Those funds are the Habitat Stewardship Program for Species at Risk, the Interdepartmental Recovery Fund, the Aboriginal Capacity Building Fund, and the Aboriginal
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3. SARA AND ENDANGERED ATLANTIC SALMON: TRICKLES
OF PROTECTION
Since SARA’s entry into force, its main protection mechanisms have been
progressively but selectively implemented, as described in this part.

(a)

Protecting Individuals
Prohibitions

and

Residences:

SARA

Automatic

Although the main body of SARA entered into force on 5 June 2003, the entry
into force of the prohibitions of s. 32 and 33 protecting individuals of species at
risk listed in Schedule 1 of SARA, including iBoF Atlantic Salmon and their residences, was postponed until 1 June 2004.44 Despite the seemingly powerful consequences that these prohibitions entail, particularly for aquatic species, fisheries activities for iBoF salmon were gradually prohibited until their complete ban even
before its listing under SARA. Commercial fisheries in iBoF Rivers were closed
after the 1984 season.45 Recreational and aboriginal fisheries were closed in 1990,
with the only exception of the Gaspereau River which remained open until 1994,
and briefly reopened in 1996 and 1997.46 In addition, s. 32 of the Fisheries Act47
already prohibited the destruction of fish “by any means other than fishing except
as authorized by the Minister or under regulations made by the Governor in Council” under the Act.
The limited practical consequences of the SARA prohibitions are confirmed
by reviewing the enforcement of these provisions. To the best of our knowledge,
there have been neither prosecutions nor convictions for violations to the SARA
prohibitions with respect to iBoF Atlantic salmon.48

44
45
46
47
48

Critical
Habitat
Protection
Fund
(online:
SARA
Public
Registry
<http://www.sararegistry.gc.ca/involved/funding/default_e.cfm>). Additionally, between 1998 and 2008 Environment Canada partnered with World Wildlife Fund WWF
(Canada) to establish the Endangered Species Recovery Fund, supporting recovery activities for species at risk of extinction (online: WWF Canada
<http://wwf.ca/conservation/species/sarrfo>). The program ended in 2008 (ibid.).
Order Fixing the Dates of the Coming into Force of Certain Sections of the Act, P.C.
2003-763, C. Gaz. 2003.II.1778 (Species at Risk Act).
Recovery Strategy, supra note 1 at 16-17.
Ibid.
R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14.
The information has been obtained from Fisheries and Oceans Canada Annual Reports
to Parliament on the National Habitat Management Program, online: Fisheries and
Oceans <http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/habitat/role/141/reports-rapports/index-eng.htm>,
SARA
Annual
Reports,
online:
SARA
Public
Registry
<http://www.sararegistry.gc.ca/default_e.cfm>, and DFO Media Archives, Charges and
Convictions, online: Fisheries and Oceans <http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/media/archiveeng.htm>. Prosecutions under SARA do not appear to be frequent, with convictions to
date being reported for violations involving only two aquatic species: Northern Wolffish and Abalone.
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(b) Planning for Recovery: the Recovery Strategy and Statement for
Action Planning
Advances for recovery planning have been made in three fronts: the overarching policy framework for recovery planning under SARA, the adoption of a Recovery Strategy for iBoF salmon, and the charting of the action planning stage.
While recovery strategy provisions in SARA are surrounded by considerable
legal mist,49 the federal government has progressively developed policy guidance
clarifying several aspects of the content of Recovery Strategies and their implementation. Main policy documents include the draft Overarching Policy Framework
posted on SARA Public Registry in December 2009,50 and Guidelines for Completing Recovery Strategy Templates (federal) adopted in February 200651 and updated
in September 2010.52
In this context of evolving policy guidance, advances were made with the
elaboration of a Recovery Strategy for iBoF salmon. In 2000, a National Recovery
Team for iBoF Atlantic was formed under the Recovery of Nationally Endangered
Wildlife (RENEW) program, with the task to draft a Recovery Strategy. After the
entry into force of SARA, it has continued its operation in support of the recovery
planning and activities of iBoF Atlantic salmon. During these 10 years of work,
more than 100 individuals, including representatives of federal and provincial government, Aboriginal communities, industry, NGOs, and academia, have participated in the recovery team, contributing their knowledge and expertise to the recovery planning process of iBoF Atlantic salmon.53
The National Recovery Team delivered an early Recovery Strategy in 2002,
which was not formally adopted because of the new and specific requirements for
the recovery planning process that SARA demanded upon its passage by Parliament in December 2002. The Recovery Team devoted itself early on to the revision
of the Recovery Strategy according to SARA provisions54, a process that according
to the new legislation should have been completed by 5 June 2006.55 The process,
however, was not concluded until April 2010 with the adoption of a SARA-compliant Recovery Strategy for iBoF Atlantic salmon, which was posted on the SARA
Public Registry on May 4, 2010.56
49
50
51
52
53

54

55
56

VanderZwaag & Hutchings, supra note 25 at 231-32.
Government of Canada, SARA Policies: Overarching Policy Framework, Draft (2009),
online: SARA Public Registry <http://www.sararegistry.gc.ca/default_e.cfm>.
Government of Canada, National Guidelines for Completing Recovery Strategies Templates (February 7, 2006) (on file with authors).
Government of Canada, National Guidelines for Completing Recovery Strategies Templates (federal) (Sept. 2010) (on file with authors).
A partial list of participants in the Recovery Team have been included in the 2002
National Recovery Strategy for inner Bay of Fundy Atlantic (Salmo salar) salmon
populations (on file with authors) and in the 2010 Recovery Strategy, supra note 1.
Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Proceedings of the Maritimes Region Species at Risk
Recovery Team Meetings of 2003, DFO Can. Sci. Advis. Sec. Proceed. Ser. 2004/041
(Dartmouth, NS: DFO Maritimes, 2004), at 20.
SARA, s. 42(2).
Recovery Strategy, supra note 1.
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The Recovery Strategy builds on the previous 2002 document but incorporates
the new SARA requirements, adding important milestones in the recovery process
of iBoF Atlantic salmon. The document starts by describing the general biology of
species, distribution, population size and trends, legal protection and resource management, and cultural and economic significance. It includes a description of the
main threats for the freshwater and marine cycle, including: changes in environmental conditions, ecological community shifts, contaminants, barriers to fish passage, aquaculture, illegal or incidental catches, and depressed population
phenomena.57
Based on this background information and analyses, the document concludes
that salmon recovery is both biologically and technically feasible,58 and sets an
overall recovery goal and recovery targets. The Strategy identifies the overall recovery goal as to “re-establish wild, self-sustaining populations as required to conserve the genetic characteristics of the remaining anadromous iBoF Atlantic
salmon.”59 Population and distribution targets were set for the short (five years)
and long term. The short term target is to:
Conserve the genetic characteristics of the few remaining anadromous iBoF
Atlantic salmon populations in order to progress towards re-establishing
self-sustaining populations to their conservation levels in the (. . .) 10 river
systems that contribute to the LGB [live gene bank] program.60

The long term target, in turn, has been defined as:
Conserve the characteristics of the few remaining anadromous iBoF Atlantic salmon populations in order to re-establish self-sustaining populations of
IBoF Atlantic salmon to a conservation level of 9,900 spawning adults distributed throughout (. . .) 19 river systems.61

To achieve these short and long term targets, the Strategy identifies five prioritized recovery objectives: a) conserve iBoF Salmon genetic characteristics and reestablish self-sustaining populations to iBoF rivers; b) identify and remedy anthropogenic threats limiting survival and/or recovery of iBoF Salmon in the marine
environment; c) identify and remedy anthropogenic threats limiting survival and/or
recovery of iBoF Salmon in the freshwater environment; d) assess population status, sustainability, and recovery feasibility; and e) communicate and increase the
general awareness of the status and recovery of iBoF salmon.62
These five objectives have been further broken down into recovery approaches, and performance indicators have been established to assess the progress
in achieving recovery objectives.63 For example, the first objective has three associated approaches: provide salmon with appropriate genetic characteristics for recolonization of iBoF rivers designated for recovery; conserve the genetic character-

57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

23–27.
28-29.
30.
30.
31.
32.
33.
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istics of the residual population from the Chignecto Bay and the Minas Basin; and
use Live Gene Bank strategies to conserve iBoF genetic characteristics and re-establish self-sustaining populations in iBoF rivers. The approaches associated to the
second objective, in turn, are: to determine marine habitat quality, quantity and use
by iBoF salmon populations; to preserve and recover marine habitat; to identify and
evaluate marine threats that could limit iBoF salmon survival and/or recovery; and
to reduce or mitigate marine threats that could limit iBoF salmon and/or recovery.
The third objective is associated with four equivalent approaches, although with
some differences in wording to adapt them to the freshwater environment.
The recovery targets articulated by the Strategy constitute positive trickles for
recovering iBoF salmon. Foremost among these is the precise articulation of science-determined recovery targets. The long-term target of 9,900 spawning adults
(estimated to represent 25 per cent of the abundance of iBoF salmon in the mid20th Century) is scientifically sound and defensible, as are the six science-based
criteria that were used to guide the selection of rivers to be allocated the highest
priority in recovery efforts.64
Another aspect of the Strategy that offers trickles of protection to iBoF Atlantic salmon is the limited number of activities with potentially harmful effects on
this species at risk that are exempted from a s. 73 incidental harm permit or s. 74
authorization. Indeed, recovery strategies and action plans may exempt certain activities from the prohibitions of ss. 32, 33 and 58,65 and potentially, these exceptions could represent a substantial interference with listed species.66 The Strategy,
based on the conclusions of the Recovery Potential Assessment considering that
“under current conditions [when the LGB is operating], neither the probability of
extinction nor the probability of recovery is very sensitive to low levels of humaninduced mortality,”67 adopts a restrictive approach to exempted activities. These
include: scientific conservation and recovery activities led and authorized by Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO); research and recovery activities authorized by
Parks Canada and undertaken within the Fundy National Park; and electrofishing
for specific purposes.68 Other activities likely to harm, harass, kill, capture or take

64

65
66
67
68

The six criteria are: represent each of the three unique subunits (Minas Basin, Gaspereau River, and Chignecto Bay); include rivers with large areas of habitat (>10 per cent
of the total measured area); include rivers with residual native populations that contribute to the LGB; represent local habitat variation within the Minas Basin and Chignecto
Bay regions; include rivers with high productivity per unit area and productive capacity; and maintain metapopulation structure by increasing the number of rivers in which
salmon are recovered (ibid. at 31).
SARA, ss. 83(4).
VanderZwaag & Hutchings, supra note 25 at 232.
Recovery Strategy, supra note 1 at 50.
The Recovery Strategy further qualifies the permitted research activities. According to
the document, the scientific conservation and recovery activities led by DFO must be
authorized by licence under ss. 52 and 56 of the Fisheries (General) Regulations and s.
4 of the Fisheries Act. Electrofishing must be authorized by licence under s. 52 of the
Fisheries (General) Regulations, conducted by qualified individuals for the purposes of
enforcement, environmental emergencies, mitigation for compensation and restoration
projects or to fulfill the conditions of Fisheries Act authorizations or Letter of Advice.
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iBoF Atlantic salmon would require a s. 73 permit or s. 74 authorization, which can
only be issued once the pertinent procedural and substantive conditions are met.
The Recovery Strategy provides further trickles of protection by charting the
future action steps of the recovery planning process. The Strategy states that it will
be implemented through one or more action plans, each “outlining steps to be taken
to implement the goals and objectives identified in the recovery strategy for the
species.”69 The first action plan shall be developed within four years of the posting
of the Strategy, or at an earlier date. Priorities to be addressed are: a) the marine
critical habitat; b) activities of the LGB program; and c) modifications to the Petitcodiac River causeway.70
The Strategy further states, however, that even without formal action plans, it
is expected that recovery actions will be undertaken for at least some of the recommended approaches outlined in the Strategy. Indeed, the Recovery Strategy itself
lists a series of completed and underway actions,71 as well as a schedule of studies
for the identification of critical habitat covering the period between 2008 and
2011,72 and a prioritization of recommended research and monitoring actions.73
One of the key initiatives that is currently underway is the LGB program, the objective of which is to conserve iBoF Atlantic salmon genetic characteristics so as to
allow for the re-establishment of self-sustaining populations in iBoF rivers once the
causes of low marine survival are better understood and managed.

(c) Identifying and Protecting Critical Habitat
(i) Identification of Critical Habitat
The Recovery Strategy identifies some critical freshwater habitat for iBoF Atlantic salmon. It was considered unnecessary to identify all freshwater habitat as
critical because of purported evidence that there is more freshwater habitat available than is required to achieve survival and recovery (although this evidence is
neither presented nor cited in the document). The identified critical freshwater
habitat consists of riffles, runs and staging or holding pools located below complete
natural barriers in the 10 rivers (including their tributaries) that contain residual
native populations of Atlantic salmon and that currently contribute to the LGB program.74 Two of those rivers are located primarily inside the boundaries of Fundy
National Park (FNP). The Strategy defines all parts of these two FNP rivers that are

69
70
71
72
73
74

The research and recovery activities undertaken within the Fundy National Park must
be authorized by Parks Canada Agency under the Canada National Parks Act or another Act of Parliament and issued for purposes of sampling and collection of iBoF
Salmon by various methods; tagging, tracking and release activities in support of the
iBoF salmon live gene bank program; and habitat restoration and improvement activities in support of the conservation and recovery of iBoF salmon (ibid. at 50-51).
Ibid. at 44.
Ibid.
Ibid. at 45–49.
Ibid. at 42.
Ibid. at 43-44.
Ibid. at 36-37.
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accessible to salmon as critical habitat, since “within the FNP there is no accessible
river habitat that does not meet the physical description of critical habitat.” The
amount of critical freshwater habitat in other iBoF salmon rivers is not quantified in
the Strategy.
Following the identification of critical freshwater habitat, and pursuant s.
58(2) of SARA, Parks Canada has published in the Canada Gazette a description of
the critical habitat within the Fundy National Park of Canada. This includes “all
habitat accessible to iBoF Atlantic salmon within the sections of the Point Wolfe
River, Bennett Brook, Hueston Brook, Upper Salmon River, Forty Five River and
Broad River.”75 The biophysical attributes of freshwater critical habitat were identified as “riffles, runs, and staging or holding pools found below complete natural
barriers (i.e. waterfalls).”76
The Recovery Strategy states that critical marine habitat was not identified
because of lack of scientific knowledge on the migration routes and patterns of
iBoF Atlantic salmon. A schedule of studies for 2008–2011 was included in the
document, and the investigation of marine habitat use, including spatial and temporal use of habitats throughout the year and particularly in winter, was identified as a
high-priority research recommendation.77

(ii) Protection of Critical Habitat
Despite the fact that some critical habitat has been identified in the
iBoF Atlantic salmon Recovery Strategy, this identification does not automatically trigger the prohibitions of s. 58. In the case of iBoF Atlantic
salmon, the protection of critical habitat is subject to two regimes. With
respect to the two FNP rivers, the Minister responsible for Parks Canada
had the obligation to publish in the Canada Gazette a description of the
critical habitat within the park within 90 days after the Recovery Strategy
that identified it is included in the public registry. The competent Minister
satisfied this obligation a few days later than statutorily required on August
7, 2010.78 Protection for this part of the critical habitat occurs automatically
90 days after this publication, on 5 November 2010, through the prohibitions of s. 58(1).
In the case of the remaining critical habitat of aquatic species, protection can take two forms. Legal protection can occur through provisions in,
or measures under, SARA or any other Act of Parliament, including agreements under s. 11; or protection can be invoked through an order under s.
58(1). Within 180 days of critical habitat identification, the competent Minister has the obligation to determine if the provisions in, or measures under,
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Description of critical habitat of inner Bay of Fundy Atlantic salmon in Fundy National Park of Canada (Parks Canada Agency), C. Gaz. 2010.I.2160 (Species at Risk
Act).
Ibid.
Recovery Strategy, supra note 1 at 36 and 42-43.
The statutory 90-day period expired on August 2, 2010.

CANADA’S SPECIES AT RISK ACT AND ATLANTIC SALMON

279

SARA or any other Act of Parliament legally protect the critical habitat, or
otherwise determine that the prohibitions of s. 58(1) are required. In the
first case, he or she has the obligation to make a critical habitat protection
statement setting out how the critical habitat is legally protected. In the second case, he or she has to make an order applying the prohibitions of s.
58(1). However, the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans has not met the 180day period protection obligation following the identification of critical
habitat in the Strategy. To date the Minister has not issued a s. 58 order nor
included a critical habitat protection statement in the Public Registry.79
(d) Fostering Stewardship for iBoF Atlantic Salmon Protection
The federal government has invested in recovery and habitat enhancement
projects for species at risk through several federal funds. The Habitat Stewardship
Program, established in 2000, has funded dozens of habitat enhancement projects,
including 14 for iBoF Atlantic salmon.80 The Interdepartmental Recovery Fund,
between 2002 and 2009, funded 14 projects to enhance knowledge on iBoF Atlantic salmon and its critical habitat, although no projects have been funded since the
2009-2010 period.81 Additionally, a myriad of projects directed to increase knowledge on Atlantic salmon and its critical habitat, enhance Atlantic salmon habitat,
and raise awareness of the status of the species, are funded periodically by private
organizations and/or provincial governments.82

4. PROTECTING ATLANTIC SALMON AT RISK: A SEA OF
CHALLENGES
Numerous challenges stand in the way of protection and potential recovery of
SARA-listed iBoF salmon and other Atlantic salmon populations considered at
risk. Ensuring implementation of SARA promises is one main concern area, with
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The 180-day period was due on 31 October 2010.
The list of funded projects is available online: Environment Canada
<http://www.ec.gc.ca/hsp-pih/default.asp?lang=En&n=015C4083-1>.
The list of funded projects is available online: SARA Public Registry
<http://www.sararegistry.gc.ca/involved/funding/irf_fir/search_e.cfm>.
The Recovery Strategy cites an “Activity Table” developed by DFO Science, Bedford
Institute of Oceanography. The table is a summary of completed activities up to March
2008 and planned activities for April 2008–March 2009, cross-referenced to the specific objectives and strategies outlined in the Strategy. This table includes a number of
projects and initiatives for, among others, scientific research, monitoring, and public
awareness. Projects include a variety of institutions, including: DFO, Parks Canada,
New Brunswick Department of Natural Resources, Fort Folly First Nation, Woodstock
First Nation, Mi’kmaq Maliseet Nations, Ecology Action Center, Atlantic Salmon Federation, Dalhousie University, Memorial University, Guelph University, and University
of British Columbia. (DFO, Bedford Institute of Oceanography, Key Results up to
March 31, 2008 and Planned Activities from April 1, 2008 to March 31, 2009, online:
<http://www.bio-iob.gc.ca/research/species_at_risk/ibof_salmon/Activities-TableiBoF-Salmon-RS-Eng.pdf>).
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key challenges being: overcoming slow SARA implementation; addressing scientific limitations of the Strategy; forging a clear agenda for recovery actions; confronting limitations in incidental harm permitting and authorizations; protecting
critical habitat; getting a grip on future Atlantic salmon protection; and integrating
the Strategy with broader policy and conservation efforts. Strengthening of the protective net outside SARA is also a major challenge, with a need to consider: bolstering environmental assessment; enhancing provincial engagement in aquatic endangered species protection; ensuring full implementation of Canada’s Oceans Act;
and charting future directions for the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation
(NASCO).

(a) Ensuring Implementation of Existing SARA Promises
(i) Overcoming Slow SARA Implementation
One of the most important criticisms of SARA has been the slow implementation of its different provisions, including: listing, adoption of recovery strategies
and action plans, and identification and protection of critical habitat.83 Lag in implementation has also plagued different stages of the protection and recovery planning process for iBoF Atlantic salmon.
Although the listing process did not represent a problem for iBoF salmon because it was automatically included in Schedule 1 when SARA entered into force,
that is not the case of nine other populations of Atlantic salmon that have been
assessed as endangered, threatened, or special concern by COSEWIC in November
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Species at Risk Advisory Committee, Presentation on the Species at Risk Act to the
Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development (Spring 2009), online: Nature Canada <http://www.naturecanada.ca/endangered_sarac.asp>; David
Suzuki Foundation, Ecojustice, Environmental Defence, and Nature Canada. Canada’s
Species at Risk Act: Implementation at a Snail’s Pace (April 2009), online: Nature
Canada <http://www.naturecanada.ca/endangered_atrisk_saraRC2009.asp>; A.Ø.
Mooers, L.R. Prugh, M. Festa-Bianchet & J.A. Hutchings, “Biases in Legal Listing
under Canadian Endangered Species Legislation” (2007) 21 Conservation Biology 572;
C. Scott Findlay, Stewart Elgie, Brian Giles & Linda Burr, “Species Listing under Canada’s Species at Risk Act” (2009) 23 Conservation Biology; VanderZwaag & Hutchings, supra note 25; and Mooers et al., supra note 25. See also: Submission to the
Commission for Environmental Cooperation pursuant to Article 14 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, October 6, 2006, submitted by Sierra
Club (U.S. and Canada), Nature Canada, The David Suzuki Foundation, Conservation
Northwest, Environmental Defence, ForestEthics, Ontario Nature, Western Canada
Wilderness Committee, BC Nature, Federation of Alberta Naturalists, the Natural History Society of Newfoundland and Labrador, Nature Nova Scotia and Nature Quebec
to
the
Commission
for
Environmental
Cooperation,
online:
CEC
<http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=1226&SiteNodeID=210&BL_ExpandID=156>;
Petition Nr. 61, 3 December 2002, to the Commissioner of Environment and Sustainable Development, and Commissioner of Environment and Sustainable Development,
Status Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development — March 2008, Chapter 12, both online: Office of the Auditor General, Environment
and
Sustainable
Development
<http://www.oagbvg.gc.ca/internet/English/esd_fs_e_46.html>.
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2010. The assessment will be communicated to the federal Minister of Environment in August 2011, which will trigger the legal requirement for the federal government to decide on its listing for protection. Fisheries and Oceans timelines for
listing are particularly slow, likely as a consequence of the more powerful consequences of the listing decision on aquatic species.84 If the current trends continue,
the listing process for the nine new Atlantic salmon populations at risk could take
at least two years. There is still also the risk that these populations will not be listed
for protection, a decision that mostly depends on the socio-economic importance of
the populations as commercial, recreational or aboriginal fisheries, as well as other
economic activities that may have a negative impact on species at risk.85
The iBoF salmon Recovery Strategy has been adopted with a considerable delay in relation to the statutory deadlines. SARA established a precise timeframe for
the adoption of the Recovery Strategy: 5 June 2006. Nevertheless, the process took
almost four years longer: the final Strategy was adopted in April 2010 and posted
in the SARA Public Registry on May 4, 2010. The delay has been explained by the
uncertainties surrounding the implementation of a new legislation, the extended
consultations required in SARA, and the need to develop studies and analyses that
Fisheries and Oceans did not have the opportunity to develop in a pre-listing
stage.86 However, the Strategy development can be characterized as excessively
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For analysis of bias in marine fish listing decisions, see Hutchings and Festa-Bianchet,
ibid.; Mooers et al., ibid.; Findlay et al., ibid. The delays in the listing process of
aquatic species can be explained by the fact that the prohibitions of s. 32 of SARA are
applied to aquatic species wherever they occur, while in the case of terrestrial species
they apply only on federal land. Because of the broader scope of the prohibitions, Fisheries and Oceans requires extended consultations and the undertaking of socio-economic analysis before the listing decision. Fisheries and Oceans Canada is responsible
for 42 of the 53 “outstanding species” in the listing process, i.e. species that have been
subject to an irregular listing process, which may include referral backs to COSEWIC
or extended consultation processes. See 2010 Report of Outstanding Species at Risk
(last
update
10
June
2010),
online:
SARA
Public
Registry
<http://www.sararegistry.gc.ca/sar/assessment/batchreporthtml_0510_e.cfm>.
The
practice of DFO to undertake socio-economic impact analyses at this stage of the process, a practice that has been noted elsewhere (Stratos Inc. Formative Evaluation of
Federal Species at Risk Programs: Final Report (Ottawa, ON: 2006), online: Environment
Canada
<http://www.ec.gc.ca/ae-ve/default.asp?lang=en&n=53869FF31&printerversion=true>).
From 16 species not listed, 15 are under the responsibility of DFO. This number does
not include species that have not been listed because of a decision to undertake extended consultation processes or to refer the assessment back to COSEWIC, which is
the case of emblematic species like the Polar and Grizzly Bears. Furthermore, the Governor in Council has recently proposed not to list another 3 aquatic species: Lake Winnipeg Physa Snail, Boccaccio, and Canary Rockfish (Order Amending Schedule 1 to
Species at Risk Act (Proposed Regulatory Text), C. Gaz. 2010.I.3227). The reason provided in most cases is the economic and social impact of the listing decision.
The Recovery Strategy is supported by several scientific documents prepared by the
DFO science branch and subject to the DFO Science Advisory Process Framework,
which may include external peer review. That is the case of the Recovery Potential
Assessment, supra note 15, and a series of working papers, published as research docu-
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long. The process had already started well before SARA was enacted with the establishment of a recovery team and a first version of a Recovery Strategy was already prepared in 2002.
The schedule for the next steps of the recovery planning process is equally
slow paced. The first action plan is expected to be prepared within four years.87
This timeframe can be questioned both on scientific and policy grounds. From
a scientific perspective, four years represent more than one generation of the endangered population.88 Furthermore, the Recovery Potential Assessment estimates
that, in the absence of human intervention and if the conditions responsible for the
decline remain unchanged, iBoF Atlantic salmon may be extirpated from two index
rivers as early as 2012 and 2016, respectively.89 Expecting a first action plan only
by 2014 is out of tune with the imminent extirpation of these populations from
main rivers in its range of distribution. From a policy perspective, the schedule
seems also inconsistent with the implicit structure of the recovery planning process
in SARA. Indeed, according to SARA the implementation of the Recovery Strategy
has to be assessed after five years of the time it was posted on the Public Registry.
In the best of cases, however, the action plan would have only been adopted a year
earlier and would still be in the early implementation stage. Furthermore, according
to SARA, the action plan must include “a statement of the measures that are to be
taken to implement the recovery strategy.”90 Thus, the actual action for recovery is
not taken but just outlined in the action plan; and the real hands-on work lies further down the road.
The Recovery Strategy is quick to emphasize that there is no need to wait for
the adoption of formal plans to begin or continue recommended approaches outlined in the document. Indeed, the ongoing activities cover the main priorities for
action plans identified in the same Strategy: Petitcodiac River causeway removal,
the LGB program, and marine habitat research. If those activities were already
identified, planned and begun, it is then puzzling that the preparation of the first
action plan is expected to take four years.
Implementation timeliness has also been an issue in critical habitat protection.
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ments, addressing the specific topics of population viability analysis, threats, and
habitat issues. See: A.J.F. Gibson, H.D. Bowlby, J.R. Bryan & P.G. Amiro, Population
Viability Analysis of inner Bay of Fundy Atlantic Salmon with and without Live Gene
Banking, DFO Can. Sci. Advis. Sec. Res. Doc. 2008/057 (Dartmouth, NS: Fisheries
and Oceans Maritime Region, 2008); Peter G. Amiro, John C. Brazner & Jennifer L.
Giorno, Assessment of the Recovery Potential for the Atlantic Salmon Designatable
Unit Inner Bay of Fundy: Threats, DFO Can. Sci. Advis. Sec. Res. Doc. 2008/059
(Dartmouth, NS: Fisheries and Oceans Maritime Region, 2008); and Peter G. Amiro,
John C. Brazner & Jennifer L. Giorno, Assessment of the Recovery Potential for the
Atlantic Salmon Designatable Unit Inner Bay of Fundy: Habitat Issues, DFO Can. Sci.
Advis. Sec. Res. Doc. 2008/058 (Dartmouth, NS: Fisheries and Oceans Maritime Region, 2008).
Recovery Strategy, supra note 1 at 44.
The best estimate of generation time for iBoF Atlantic salmon is 3.7 years (COSEWIC,
supra note 3 at 19).
Recovery Potential Assessment, supra note 15 at 8.
SARA, s. 49(1)(d).
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To date, the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans has not fulfilled its legal obligations
under s. 58 and has not issued either a critical habitat protection statement or the
critical habitat protection order for iBoF Atlantic salmon within the statutory 180day timeframe.

(ii) Addressing Scientific Limitations of the Recovery Strategy
The Strategy does not set out a comprehensive (even moderately so) scientific
basis for meaningful recovery actions that adequately reflects the breadth of available scientific research and opinion. The Strategy includes 104 references, 51 (49
per cent) of which were authored by Fisheries and Oceans’ personnel. An ISI Web
of Science search for “Atlantic salmon” (as topic) and “Canada” (as address)
yielded 2488 publications, 770 (31 per cent) of which included co-authors whose
address included “Fisheries and Oceans.” One could argue that the proportional
representation of publications in the Recovery Strategy co-authored by DFO personnel might have been expected to have been lower and reflective of the proportional representation of DFO science contributions to the study of the species. Further limitations on the scientific breadth of the Strategy may be reflected by the
observation that 19 of the DFO’s 51 (37 per cent) contributions were co-authored
by the same individual.
The Strategy also inadequately reflects recent scientific research, where “recent” could be defined as research published in the past six years (the criterion used
by Canada’s national funding agencies for research in the natural and social sciences). Using 2004 as the baseline year for the 2010 Strategy, 26 of 104 (25 per
cent) publications could be defined as “recent.” However, of these 26 papers, 21
were co-authored by DFO personnel, again suggesting a bias in the research cited
in support of the information provided in the Strategy. The most recent publication
year for a cited document is 2008, all of which were co-authored by DFO
personnel.
Any citation bias in the Recovery Strategy towards research undertaken by
non-DFO personnel is almost certainly unintentional. The bias is likely reflective of
the research backgrounds and scientific affiliations of the individuals who participated in the development of the document. While a bias is explicable, it does not
render the bias acceptable.
A further aspect of concern in the content of the Strategy is the lack of explicit
and clear description of the state of the scientific knowledge in some particular
areas. One example is the research milieu on threats to wild salmon populations
resulting from aquaculture, a subject matter that is surprisingly under-represented
in the Strategy. Since the first international symposium on the topic (specific to
Atlantic salmon) in Loen, Norway, in 1989,91 there have been enormous advances
in the knowledge of the consequences of, for example, interbreeding between wild
and farmed salmon, yet little of this is evident in the Strategy. One might conclude,
based on the citations in the document, that much remained to be learned on this
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L.P. Hansen, T. Håstein, G. Naevdal, R.L. Saunders & J.E. Thorpe, eds., Interactions
between cultured and wild Atlantic salmon. Proceedings of a symposium hosted by the
Directorate for Nature Management and Norwegian Institute for Nature Research held
in the Hotel Alexandria; 23–26 April 1990; Loen, Norway (1991) 98 Aquaculture 1.
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topic and that it was too early to undertake appropriate risk assessments resulting
from this COSEWIC-identified threat to iBoF salmon. Missing among the citations
in the Strategy are key reviews in this area, including those by Weir and Grant in
2005,92 Tymchuk and Devlin in 2005, 2006 and 2007,93 and Hutchings and Fraser
in 2008,94 among others. Indeed, further research in this area is identified as a
“knowledge gap” and as a topic of high-priority research.
Various windows exist for addressing the scientific limitations evident in the
Strategy. A specific action plan on further scientific research priorities and activities might be developed. The Strategy itself might eventually be strengthened on
the scientific front as SARA requires periodic 5-year reviews.

(iii) Forging a Clear Agenda for Recovery Actions
A key challenge for iBoF recovery is to ensure that effective, timely and precautionary recovery actions are adopted and implemented. The Recovery Strategy,
however, surrounds the action planning stage with considerable mist by including a
limited identification of recovery approaches and an inadequate description of the
action planning stage.
The iBoF Salmon Strategy identifies a number of approaches associated with
each objective that provide “both the direction and flexibility” for achieving the
iBoF salmon recovery targets.95 These approaches have been worded at a high
level of generality,96 emphasizing two main broad strategic directions: the use of
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Laura K. Weir & James W.A. Grant, “Effects of aquaculture on wild fish populations:
a synthesis of data” (2005) 13 Environmental Review 145.
W.E. Tymchuk & R.H. Devlin, “Growth differences among first and second generation
hybrids of domesticated and wild rainbow trout (Oncorhynchus mykiss)” (2005) 245
Aquaculture 295; Wendy E. Tymchuk, Carlo Biagi, Ruth Withler & Robert Devlin,
“Growth and behavioral consequences of introgression of a domesticated aquaculture
genotype into a native strain of coho salmon” (2006) 135 Transactions of the American
Fishery Society 442; Wendy E. Tymchuk, L. Fredrik, Sundström & Robert H. Devlin,
“Growth And Survival Trade-Offs And Outbreeding Depression In Rainbow Trout
(Oncorhynchus mykiss)” (2007) 61 Evolution 1225.
Jeffrey A. Hutchings & Dylan J. Fraser, “The nature of fisheries- and farming-induced
evolution” (2008) 17 Molecular Ecology 294.
Recovery Strategy, supra note 1 at 32.
The clearest example of the general wording of the approaches is given by the common
approaches provided to the second and third objective of the Strategy: identify and
remedy anthropogenic threats limiting survival and/or recovery of iBoF salmon in the
marine environment and in the freshwater environment (ibid. at 33). The approaches
include “Identification and evaluation” and “reduction and mitigation” of both marine
and freshwater threats, without an explicit reference to specific anthropogenic threats
already identified in the Strategy. Some further details have been given in a subsequent
section of knowledge gaps and research and monitoring recommendations, emphasizing the research approaches rather than the management approaches (ibid. at 43). This
emphasis probably reflects the Strategy’s conclusion that “the factors that have caused
the collapse of wild Atlantic salmon populations in the iBoF since 1980s are not well
understood” (ibid. at 23).
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the LGB program to maintain population diversity;97 and research priorities and
recommendations directed to a better understanding of factors that have caused the
collapse of wild Atlantic salmon.98
The Strategy does not include strategic approaches for the management of
identified threats limiting iBoF salmon, which is remarkable since preparatory
working documents, including the Recovery Potential Assessment, had already
identified many mitigation measures and alternatives for several of the iBoF
salmon threats.99 Those working documents suggested among other mitigation
measures for aquaculture interactions: improved containment; contingency plans
and reporting systems for escaped fish; improved fish health management; improved effluent management; improved risk assessment to determine appropriate
donor stock; use of sterile fish; and use of predator nets.100 Suggested mitigation
measures for fisheries interactions included season, area and gear restrictions to
reduce incidences of iBoF salmon capture; and the definition of ecosystem objectives that include iBoF Atlantic salmon for management purposes.101 To counter
freshwater environmental threats, the Recovery Potential Assessment suggested enhancing and formalizing the risk-based management approach for review of development proposals in and around iBoF habitat pursuant the habitat provisions of the
Fisheries Act, SARA and CEAA; and increasing management and tracking of cumulative effects, including water extractions.102 Further mitigation measures were
suggested for contaminant impacts, e.g. application of best management practices
for agriculture, forestry and other industries to reduce or minimize herbicide and
pesticide runoff, and for physical barriers to fish passage.103
Although uncertainties surrounding the nature and timeline for management
actions for recovery of iBoF salmon could be addressed at the action planning
stage, this is an area where the lack of legal and policy guidance and the hazy
statement of the Recovery Strategy leave considerable discretion to Fisheries and
Oceans Canada. SARA does not address the process, timing, or implementation
mechanisms of action plans, and only outlines main required contents.104 These
include: identification and protection of critical habitat;105 the measures to implement the recovery strategy and their timeline;106 methods to monitor recovery and
long-term viability of the species;107 and evaluation of the socio-economic costs
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Ibid. at 32-33.
Ibid. at 33-34 and 43.
See: Recovery Potential Assessment, supra note 15; Amiro i, Can. Sci. Advis. Sec. Res.
Doc. 2008/059, supra note 86.
Recovery Potential Assessment, ibid. at 22.
Ibid. at 22-23.
Ibid. at 23.
Ibid.
VanderZwaag & Hutchings, supra note 25 at 231-32.
SARA, s. 49(1)(a) to (c).
SARA, s. 49(1)(d).
SARA, s. 49(1)(d.1).
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and benefits.108 The Governor in Council may prescribe further contents by regulations, but to date this regulatory power has not been exercised.109
The SARA Overarching Policy Framework does not offer specific recommendations for action planning, but addresses action plans together with strategies
under the recovery planning process.110 No specific guideline for action plan templates has been developed so far. The Guidelines for Completing Recovery Strategy Templates only provide guidance on the length of the action plan statement,
recommending it to be a sentence length.111 Both DFO and Park Canada have provided further written suggestions that are particularly brief: “An action plan or xx
action plans will be completed by [month YY].”112
The iBoF Salmon Strategy follows the minimal content suggested in the guidance. The Strategy states that “It is expected that one or more action plans for this
species will be developed, each outlining steps to be taken to implement the goals
and objectives identified in the recovery strategy for the species.”113 The document
adds that “several priorities that have been identified thus far to be potentially considered during the action planning process include addressing marine critical
habitat, the activities of the LGB program and modifications to the Petitcodiac
River causeway.”114
Thus, the Strategy leaves Fisheries and Oceans Canada to decide how many
action plans need to be developed, and their content. Also left to Fisheries and
Oceans discretion is the timeline for drafting these action plans. The Strategy only
states that the first of one or many action plans with undefined content will be
produced within four years.
This approach follows a narrow interpretation of SARA ss. 41(1)(g), which
requires “a statement of when one or more action plans in relation to the recovery
strategy will be completed.” The requirement of the timeline is understood to apply
to one action plan even if the Strategy requires or recommends more than one. A
broader interpretation of this provision is that the Strategy requires a comprehensive timeline for the action planning stage, including all action plans.

(iv) Confronting Limitations in Incidental Harm Permitting and
Authorizations
A further challenge for the iBoF salmon recovery process is the need to confront three main limitations in the design and implementation of incidental harm
permitting: the lack of policy and scientific guidance for issuing permits and authorizations; the non-precautionary basis for allowing some incidental human-induced
mortality; and the limited application of these SARA provisions. Each of those lim-
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SARA, s. 49(1)(e).
SARA, ss. 29(1)(f) and 49(2).
Supra note 50 at 24–30. There is only one paragraph particular to action plans, which
addresses socio-economic considerations (ibid., para. 4.9 at 30).
Supra note 52 at 22.
Ibid. at 23-24.
Recovery Strategy, supra note 1 at 44.
Ibid.
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itations is explained after a summary of the incidental harm permitting provisions
of SARA.

A. Understanding Incidental Harm Permitting
While killing, harming, harassing, capturing or taking any individual of iBoF
Atlantic salmon is prohibited by SARA, the legislation gives the competent Minister the power to allow activities having that negative effect under a s. 73 agreement or permit, subject to several procedural and substantive conditions. The need
for an agreement or permit applies both to existing activities or new developments,
since SARA does not provide for the “grandfathering” of harmful activities.
From a substantive perspective, s. 73 requires that the activity be:
a) scientific research relating to the conservation of the species and conducted by qualified persons;
b) beneficial for the species or required to enhance its chance of survival
in the wild; or
c) incidental in the affect on the species.
Additionally, before issuing the permit the Minister must further be of the
opinion that:
d) all reasonable alternatives to the activity that would reduce the impact
on the species have been considered and the best solution has been
adopted;
e) all feasible measures will be taken to minimize the impact of the activity on the species or its critical habitat or the residences of its individuals;
and
f) the activity will not jeopardize the survival or recovery of the species.
Procedurally, it is required that agreements and permits are not issued for a
term longer than five and three years, respectively; and that an explanation of why
the agreement was entered into or the permit issued is included in the SARA Public
Registry.
Alternatively, and according to s. 74 of the Act, an agreement, permit, licence,
order or other similar document authorizing a person or organization to engage in
an activity affecting a listed wildlife species or the residences of its individuals,
issued or made by the competent Minister under another Act of Parliament has the
same effect as an agreement or permit under s. 73, provided that the Minister is
satisfied that the substantive and procedural conditions of s. 73 have been met.

B. Addressing the Lack of Policy and Scientific Guidance for Permits and
Authorizations
The incidental harm provisions of SARA have several elements of uncertainty
and of ministerial discretion not subject to either substantive or procedural
checks.115 A key source of uncertainty is the lack of definition of the concept of
jeopardy to survival and recovery.116 Policy guidelines have not addressed the in-
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VanderZwaag & Hutchings, supra note 25 at 228 and 244.
Ibid. at 228.
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terpretation of jeopardy. DFO has adopted the policy of relying on allowable harm
assessments or recovery potential assessments to evaluate the scope for harm under
s. 73 of SARA.117 In the case of the iBoF Atlantic salmon, the conclusion of the
Recovery Potential Assessment, adopted by the Recovery Strategy, is that “low
levels of human-induced mortality have little effect on the probability of extinction
when the LGB is operating, even at very low levels of at-sea survival.”118
Neither the Recovery Potential Assessment nor the Strategy defines what constitutes a “low” level of human-induced mortality, nor do they define what is meant
by “very sensitive” when referring to the impacts of this mortality on salmon.
Therefore, both documents missed the opportunity to fill the gap of legal and policy
documents and provide clear guidance on the interpretation of the concept of “jeopardy” and the threshold of allowable harm for iBoF salmon.

C. Confronting the Non-Precautionary Basis for Allowable Harm
Assessment
The rationale for considering that low levels of human-induced mortality have
little effect on the probability of extinction is made on the basis that the LGB program is operating. The LGB program is, therefore, essentially being identified as
the mitigative activity that permits iBoF salmon to experience harm (under current
levels of salmon mortality at sea). This is surprising given that the LGB program,
notwithstanding its potential merits, has not yet proven to be an effective strategy
in recovering iBoF salmon. Indeed, a comprehensive review of the ability of captive breeding programs to conserve salmonid biodiversity, not cited by the Strategy,
concluded that the loss of fitness (including genetic variability) in captivity can be
rapid and that there is “currently little evidence that captive-bred lines of salmonids
can or cannot be reintroduced as self-sustaining populations.”119 Given the uncertainty in the potential effectiveness of the LGB program, one would think that its
identification as the sole mitigative action that permits harm to be experienced by
iBoF salmon is non-precautionary from a species-at-risk perspective and inconsistent with the objectives of SARA.

D. Ensuring Ample Implementation of Incidental Harm Provisions
Another concern is the limited implementation of incidental harm permits as
the mechanism to ensure that activities will not have a detrimental impact on iBoF
Atlantic salmon. The SARA Public Registry has included to date 48 s. 73 permits
and two s. 74 authorizations.120 All s. 73 permits have been issued by DFO, while
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See: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Revised Framework for Evaluation of Scope for
Harm under Section 73 of the Species at Risk Act, DFO Can. Sci. Advis. Sec. Stock
Status report 2004/048 (Ottawa: DFO, 2004); Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Practitioners Guide to the Species at Risk Act (SARA) for Habitat Management Staff (draft)
(March 2006) (on file with authors) at 45-46.
118 Recovery Potential Assessment, supra note 15 at 26.
119 Dylan Fraser, “How Well Can Captive Breeding Programs Conserve Biodiversity? A
Review of Salmonids” (2008) 1 Evolutionary Applications 535.
120 Information provided by SARA Public Registry as to April 24, 2011. One permit was
issued in 2005, one in 2007, 18 in 2008, 19 in 2009, and 11 in 2010.
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the two s. 74 authorizations were issued by Park Canada. These permits and authorizations were issued to undertake scientific research on iBoF Atlantic salmon, research on other species, fish surveys in preparation of environmental assessments
or monitoring programs, and habitat enhancement projects.
The SARA Public Registry has not included any permit for activities explicitly
identified as threats for the species in the Recovery Strategy, including aquaculture,
tidal barriers and by-catch fishing. There appears to be an obvious inconsistency
between the scientific assessment of what is threatening iBoF Atlantic salmon, and
the use of the SARA tools to ensure that those threats are analyzed, their impacts
avoided or lessened, and the harmful activities properly monitored.

(v) Protecting Critical Habitat
Since the provisions for protection of critical habitat are the most complex in
the Act, reflecting multi-jurisdictional authorities and the complementary nature of
SARA,121 a first challenge in critical habitat protection is to clarify the scope and
content of the federal obligations under SARA. Particular challenges in this respect
are the uncertainties in SARA provisions, limited policy guidance, almost non-existent implementation, and ongoing judicial review.
Because Fisheries and Oceans Canada has not implemented s. 58 of SARA in
relation to iBoF salmon, critical habitat is currently protected through the provisions of the Fisheries Act, which impose further challenges to critical habitat protection. These challenges include: the discretionary nature of the Fisheries Act protection to fish habitat; the purported illegality of Fisheries and Oceans
implementation procedures; the lack of effectiveness of the fisheries habitat protection provisions; the limitations in their scope; and their limited practical
implementation.

A. Sorting Out SARA Critical Habitat Protection Requirements for Aquatic
Species
SARA’s provisions on critical habitat protection require the Minister to determine, 180 days after the critical habitat identification, whether critical habitat is
“legally protected” by provisions in, or measures under, SARA or any other Act of
Parliament. It does not define, however, what “legal protection” means.
This vacuum has not been filled with policy guidance. SARA’s Overarching
Policy Framework addresses protection of critical habitat in a few short paragraphs,
mostly to recommend that critical habitat be protected by the use of existing provisions in, or measures under, other Acts of Parliament.122 Only where those measures do not exist, the use of agreements under s. 11, s. 58 prohibitions, or regulations made under s. 59, is encouraged.123
The provisions have had very limited implementation. To date, critical habitat
protection statements have been posted for only five species (including three
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SARA, preamble, para. 4 and 6.
Supra note 50 at 15.
123 Ibid.
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aquatic species),124 and orders have been made only for one aquatic species comprising two populations.125 As has been pointed out elsewhere, this order was probably more the consequence of “legal action taken by the environmental community” than the federal government pro-activity.126
Most statements and orders have been issued by DFO,127 likely because
aquatic species are protected by SARA wherever they occur, while most terrestrial
species are only protected in federal lands and require a “safety net” order to protect provincial land or land in a territory. The approach of DFO, in the limited
implementation of s. 58, has been to consider that critical habitat is legally protected by the fish habitat protection provisions of the Fisheries Act, particularly s.
35, in relation to the prohibition to kill, harm, harass, take or capture individuals of
species at risk contained in s. 32 of SARA. Other specific regulations and codes of
practice have been cited in addition, on a species-specific basis. As a consequence,
Fisheries and Oceans has mostly concluded that a critical habitat protection order
triggering the s. 58 prohibitions is not necessary.
This interpretation of s. 58 has been recently reviewed and rejected by the
Federal Court in David Suzuki Foundation v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries and
Oceans and Minister of the Environment) (Killer whale case).128 The judgment reaffirms an ecosystem notion of critical habitat that includes geophysical, biological,
chemical and acoustic attributes of critical habitat.129 As a consequence, all of
these attributes need to be legally protected.130 It further adds that “Ministerial discretion does not legally protect critical habitat within the meaning of s. 58 of
SARA, and it was unlawful for the Minister to have cited discretionary provisions
of the Fisheries Act in the Protection Statement.”131 It also concludes that it is
unlawful for the Minister to cite provincial regulations, prospective laws and regulations, and voluntary measures.132
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Engelmann’s Quillwort Critical Habitat in the Trent-Severn Waterway National Historic Site of Canada, Pink Sand-verbena Critical Habitat in Pacific Rim National Park
Reserve of Canada, Northern Bottlenose Whale (Scotian Shelf Population), Nooksack
Dace, and North Atlantic Right whale (see online: SARA Public Registry
<http://www.sararegistry.gc.ca/default_e.cfm>).
Northeast Pacific Northern and Southern Resident Populations of Killer whale (Orcinus
orca)
populations
(see
online:
SARA
Public
Registry
<http://www.sararegistry.gc.ca/default_e.cfm>).
David Suzuki Foundation et al., supra note 83.
From the seven critical habitat statements issued so far, five have been issued by DFO
and two by Park Canada. The five statements of DFO include two archived statements.
Thus, currently, three aquatic species and two terrestrial species have critical habitat
statements. The only critical habitat order was issued by DFO.
David Suzuki Foundation v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans and Minister of
the Environment), [2010] F.C.J. No. 1471, 2010 FC 1233.
Ibid., para. 222 at 47. See also Environmental Defence Canada v. Canada (Minister of
Fisheries and Oceans), [2009] F.C.J. No. 1052, 2009 FC 878.
Ibid. at 71.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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The judgment has been appealed by DFO.133 At the moment, the meaning of
“legal protection” for critical habitat protection is entangled in a judicial review.
If the interpretation of the judgment is upheld, there are other aspects of s. 58
that will require further interpretation and guidance. The concept of destruction of
critical habitat, particularly as applied to the different attributes of critical habitat,
needs to be clarified. Further analysis will be required to determine the implementation of s. 58 prohibitions and its enforcement in situations where destruction of
critical habitat results from cumulative impacts, activities taking place outside the
critical habitat area, or in cases where the activity and the destruction of habitat
have remote or indirect causal relationships.

B. Enhancing Fish Habitat Protection under the Fisheries Act
The current uncertainty surrounding the statutory interpretation of s. 58 has
had a clear impact on the protection of iBoF salmon critical habitat. To date, the
Minister has not issued either a critical habitat protection statement or a critical
habitat protection order for iBoF Atlantic salmon. In the absence of an order triggering s. 58 prohibitions, iBoF Atlantic salmon critical freshwater habitat is protected through the provisions of the Fisheries Act, which the Federal Court has
deemed not equivalent to the “legal protection” required in SARA.134 Section 35 of
the Fisheries Act prohibits any person to carry on any work or undertaking that
results in the harmful alteration, disruption or destruction (HADD) of fish habitat,
unless an authorization of the Minister is obtained or the work or undertaking is
carried out under regulations made by the Governor in Council under the Fisheries
Act.
The Recovery Strategy asserts that all habitat in iBoF is protected under the
Fisheries Act and will continue to be protected by both the Fisheries Act and
SARA.135 Although the Recovery Strategy does not specify how this protection
would take place, Fisheries and Oceans has developed policy guidelines to implement the fish habitat protection provisions under the Fisheries Act, including the
implementation of these policies in cases where fish habitat protection is required
for protecting species at risk.
To guide the implementation of the Fisheries Act habitat provisions, and particularly s. 35, Fisheries and Oceans developed the overarching 1986 Policy for the
Management of Fish Habitat, which introduced the “no net loss” policy as a guiding principle to fish habitat management decisions. Proposed works and undertakings are assessed through a risk management framework to determine if the activity
constitutes a HADD of fish habitat. This assessment can conclude that a) the activity, as proposed or with modifications recommended by DFO, does not cause a
HADD and does not require an authorization, which is informed to the proponent
through a Letter of Advice; b) the activity does cause an unacceptable HADD to
fish habitat, in which case the authorization is denied; or c) the activity does cause
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See Federal Court, Court Index and Docket, Court Number T-1552-08, online: Federal
Court <http://cas-ncr-nter03.cas-satj.gc.ca/fct-cf/index.html>.
134 David Suzuki Foundation v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans and Minister of
the Environment), supra note 128.
135 Recovery Strategy, supra note 1 at 41.
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an acceptable HADD to fish habitat, in which case a HADD authorization can be
issued after an environmental assessment according to the Canadian Environmental
Assessment Act.136
After the entry into force of SARA, guidelines were developed to incorporate
specific considerations of HADD to the habitat of SARA-listed species in the risk
management framework.137 In cases were a HADD that affects a species at risk is
allowed, the HADD authorization would require compliance with s. 73 substantive
and procedural conditions. This authorization, known as SARA-complaint HADD
authorization, also serves as SARA incidental harm authorization according to s.74.
This approach to habitat protection for species at risk faces several limitations.
A first limitation is that, despite the efforts to provide specific guidelines for the
consideration of the particular circumstances of species at risk and the legal obligations under SARA within the risk management framework, there is still ample
room for discretion in the authorization process that renders the protection of critical habitat uncertain. Fisheries and Oceans has not developed particular and specific guidance on some key issues in the implementation of the risk management
framework, including the assessment of residual effects, the sensitivity of the
SARA-species and critical habitat, or the possibility of compensating for the loss of
critical habitat.
The legality of the procedure for issuing HADD authorizations is a further
matter of controversy. The possibility of issuing letters of advice informing a proponent that a work and undertaking has likely no impact on fish habitat, either as
proposed or with some additional mitigation measures, has been criticized not as
discretionary but as bluntly illegal for breaching other pieces of legislation.138 This
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Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Practitioners Guide to the Risk Management Framework
for DFO Habitat Management Staff, version 1.0, at 8, online: DFO <http://www.dfompo.gc.ca/habitat/role/141/1415/14155/index-eng.htm>. The Risk Management
Framework considers the possibility of issuing streamlined authorization process for
medium risk activities (i.e. small-scale or temporary HADD) (ibid. at 8 and 21). However, there are only a limited number of streamlined processes established (Fisheries
and Oceans Canada, Practitioners Guide to Writing Letters Used in Fisheries Act and
Species at Risk Act Reviews for Habitat Management Staff, version 2.0, 2007, at 4,
online:
DFO
<http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/habitat/role/141/1415/14155/indexeng.htm>). Where there is no streamlined authorization process, a site-specific authorization must be issued (ibid.). It is also worth mentioning that, in the case a HADD
permit is issued under s. 35, the authorization can include mitigation measures, compensation, monitoring and financial securities commensurate with the level of impact
associated with the project.
137 See: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Practitioners Guide to the Species at Risk Act
(SARA) for Habitat Management Staff, supra note 117; Fisheries and Oceans Canada,
Practitioners Guide to Writing an Authorization for the Habitat Protection Provisions
of the Fisheries Act, version 2.0, September 2010, online: DFO <http://www.dfompo.gc.ca/habitat/role/141/1415/14155/index-eng.htm>; and Fisheries and Oceans
Canada, Practitioners Guide to Writing Letters Used in Fisheries Act and Species at
Risk Act Reviews for Habitat Management Staff, ibid.
138 Arlene Kwasniak, “Slow on the Trigger: The Department of Fisheries and Oceans, the
Fisheries Act and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act” (2004) 27 Dal. L.J.
347.
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potential illegality has been, however, challenged and dismissed in one judicial
review.139
A further challenge lies in the effectiveness of the fish habitat protection provisions of the Fisheries Act and the implementation guidelines. The fish habitat
policy and its implementation have been recently subject to review by the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development140 and the conclusions
shed more than a doubt on the actual protection to fish habitat resulting from the
application of these policy documents. Among other problems, the Commissioner
noted a lack of consistency and predictability in the implementation of the policy
documents, lack of detailed national guidance to help staff to make decisions, little
monitoring of compliance and evaluation of the effectiveness of the decisions, and
deficient enforcement efforts. As a result, DFO “still cannot determine the extent to
which it is progressing toward the Policy’s long-term objective of a net gain in fish
habitat.”141 This assessment, serious as it may be in the case of fish habitat in general, is especially worrisome for critical habitat of aquatic species in imminent risk
of extinction.
Another limitation of using s. 35 of the Fisheries Act to protect critical habitat
is the limited scope of coverage. Section 35 applies in cases of work and undertakings, but not to other activities that may impact the habitat and the species at risk
that depend on it.
A final limitation relates to the actual implementation of fish habitat protection
provisions under the Fisheries Act to projects potentially affecting iBoF Atlantic
salmon. An analysis of the SARA s. 73 permits and s. 74 authorizations issued for
iBoF Atlantic salmon included in the SARA Public Registry shows that Fisheries
and Oceans has not issued s. 74 authorizations. This only allows concluding that, in
DFO’s expert judgment, none of the works and undertakings reviewed since June
2004 in any of the 50 listed iBoF Atlantic salmon rivers have been considered to
have a HADD that affected Atlantic salmon and that would require a SARA-compliant HADD authorization.

(vi) Getting a Grip on Future Atlantic Salmon Listing and Protection
There is still a potential challenge on the horizon, resulting from the recent
assessment and potential listing of nine other Atlantic salmon designatable units as
endangered, threatened, or special concern by COSEWIC in November 2010. If
listed, DFO will need to determine how to address the conservation and recovery of
distinctive conservation units that share, nevertheless, biological characteristics,
habitat requirements, and potential threats.
Although the newly assessed populations will likely benefit from the experience and background work that has already been developed for Atlantic salmon,
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141 Ibid. at 12.
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there is also the risk that the recovery process of iBoF Atlantic salmon being detained or slowed down in order to address the recovery of this unit jointly or at least
coordinately with one or more of the other Atlantic salmon populations at risk.
Relevant questions relate, for example, with the number, role, composition and interactions of recovery teams or other advisory bodies; with the adoption of separate
recovery strategies or the adaptation of the existing one for new populations; and
with the feasibility and desirability of adopting joint or separate action plans. It will
be a challenge to balance the need to approach the issues affecting all Atlantic
salmon populations through coherent and comprehensive strategies, plans, research
and actions; and the need to act as soon as possible to recover iBoF Atlantic
salmon.

(vii) Integrating the Recovery Strategy to Broader Policy and Conservation
Efforts
A further aspect where the Strategy shows striking limitation is in its lack of
explicit relationship with policy and conservation efforts directly related to the protection of Atlantic salmon. This weakness speaks of an apparent lack of integration
and coordination in the federal government response to conservation of wildlife,
which may represent important challenges in the conservation and management responses for iBoF Atlantic salmon.
The iBoF Salmon Recovery Strategy does not make any reference to Canada’s Policy for Conservation of Wild Atlantic Salmon.142 This document was developed at the same time as the iBoF Atlantic salmon Recovery Strategy, and its
final version was adopted only one year earlier in August 2009.143 Being the explicit intention of the Policy to serve as a governing framework for the implementation of statutory authorities for conservation of Atlantic salmon,144 it is simply
striking that the Strategy does not acknowledge the framework set out in the Policy.
Further, the Strategy does not make any reference to international protection
and conservation efforts for Atlantic salmon. The possible need to strengthen cooperation with the United States regarding research, data collection and sharing, and
management for common or transboundary threats to Atlantic salmon was not con-

142

Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Canada’s Policy for Conservation of Wild Atlantic
Salmon (August, 2009), online: Fisheries and Oceans <http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/fmgp/policies-politiques/wasp-pss/index-eng.htm>. This document was adopted in August 2009 and constitutes an overarching policy framework to achieve the goal of
maintaining and restoring healthy and diverse salmon populations (including iBoF
salmon) and their habitat, for the benefit and enjoyment of the people of Canada in
perpetuity.
143 Ibid. The preparation of a Policy for the Conservation of Atlantic Salmon was announced in December 2004 and the work started in 2005 (Fisheries and Oceans Maritimes Region online: <http://www2.mar.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/science/diad/wasp/e/introe.html>).
144 Its objective is to “represents Canada’s commitment and planned course of action for
the conservation of wild Atlantic salmon. (. . .) It neither amends nor overrides existing
legislation or regulations but will govern how these statutory authorities will be implemented” (ibid.).
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sidered. Conservation efforts by the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization were mentioned,145 but their potential contribution for iBoF Atlantic salmon
protection were not further explored nor explicitly considered as a specific strategic
approach.146

(b) Strengthening Protective Nets Outside SARA
SARA cannot “swim alone” in the protection and recovery of species at risk.
Numerous federal and provincial laws and regulations may also contribute to species at risk protection, especially when their implementation is in line with the recovery planning process and the protective tools under SARA. Particularly relevant
for Atlantic salmon is the need to: bolster environmental impact assessment; enhance provincial engagement; ensure full implementation of Canada’s Oceans Act;
and chart future directions for the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization (NASCO). The need to strengthen Canadian aquaculture law and policy framework is not discussed in this article as it has been extensively analyzed
elsewhere.147

(i) Bolstering Environmental Impact Assessment
While examples of effective environmental impact assessment (EIA) application to species at risk threats may be found,148 the rather weak EIA enhancements
provided by, and pursuant to, SARA raise the ongoing need to consider ways to
further strengthen environmental assessment review in the species at risk context.149 Key areas that warrant further consideration are: the lack of a SARA-trigger for federal environmental assessment; the need for more comprehensive assessments; the apparent lack of consistency in the implementation of SARA
requirements for environmental assessments; and the lack of clear guidance on the
application of the precautionary approach.
SARA does not trigger a federal environmental assessment in cases where
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Recovery Strategy, supra note 1 at 12.
See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
147 David L. VanderZwaag & Gloria Chao, eds., Aquaculture law and policy: towards
principled access and operations (London; New York: Routledge, 2006).
148 For example, the joint federal-provincial environmental assessment review panel for
the Whites Point Quarry development proposal in Nova Scotia applied a strong precautionary approach and in part because of the scientific uncertainty regarding potential
impacts on endangered Atlantic salmon, recommended against project approval. The
advice was subsequently followed by both federal and provincial governments. See:
David L. VanderZwaag & Jason May, “Quarrels over a Proposed Quarry in Nova Scotia: Successful Application of Sustainability Principle in Environmental Impact Assessment but Not a Perfect Ending” in Klaus Bosselmann, Ron Engel & Prue Taylor, eds.,
Governance for Sustainability: Issues, Challenges, Successes (Gland, Switzerland:
IUCN; Bonn: in collaboration with the IUCN Environmental Law Centre, 2008) 111.
149 A comprehensive critique of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act is beyond
the scope of this paper. For a critical review of the Act, see Meinhard Doelle, The
Federal Environmental Assessment Process: A Guide and Critique (Markham, Ont.:
LexisNexis Canada, 2008).
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species at risk may be affected. The Act only requires the consideration of adverse
environmental effects on species at risk within the existing, and limited, scope of
federal environmental assessments.150
If the environmental assessment of a work or undertaking is triggered, the potential adverse effects to species at risk do not influence the type of assessment
being undertaken. In a vast majority of cases, the assessment will be limited to an
environmental screening,151 which has been subject to serious scrutiny regarding
their effectiveness and efficacy.152 A comprehensive study takes place only for the
limited works and undertakings included in the Comprehensive Study List Regulations.153 The Minister of Environment has rarely used the option of referring a
project with significant adverse environmental effects or that warrants public concern to a review panel. The option of referring such a project to a mediator has not
been used.154
When a federal environmental assessment is conducted, the Responsible Authority must ensure that the requirements of s. 79 of SARA are met. Although a
comprehensive analysis of the extent to which this requirement has been fulfilled is
beyond the scope of this study, the review of a sample of environmental screening
reports for finfish aquaculture projects within the Bay of Fundy155 raises concerns
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In contrast, the New Brunswick Environmental Impact Assessment Regulation under
the Clean Environment Act includes, as undertakings that requires an environmental
assessment, all enterprises, activities, projects, structures, works or programs affecting
any unique, rare or endangered feature of the environment (New Brunswick Regulation
87-83, Environmental Impact Assessment Regulation, O.C. 87-558, (Clean Environment Act), Schedule A paragraph u).
According to a 2009 Report by the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable
Development, 99 per cent of the environmental assessments are undertaken as screenings, while, on average, eight comprehensive studies and five panels have taken place
annually (Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development, Report of
the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development to the House of
Commons, Fall 2009, Chapter 1, Applying the Canadian Environmental Assessment
Act, online: Office of the Auditor General, Environment and Sustainable Development
<http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/esd_fs_e_46.html>).
Ibid. at 19-20.
SOR/94-638.
CEAA, ss. 25–28; Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development,
supra note 151.
Five Environmental Assessment (Screening) Reports were reviewed: Proposed
Aquaculture Sites for the Culture of Atlantic salmon near Long Island in St. Mary’s
Bay, Nova Scotia, Canadian Environmental Assessment Register (CEAR) reference
number 10-01-55946; Bliss Harbour Aquaculture Lease MF-0029 and MF-0032 Kelly
Cove Aquaculture Ltd., CEAR Ref. Nr. 10-01-54205; Finfish Aquaculture Site MF0027 (Consolidation of MF-0027 and MF-0025), Bliss Harbour, NB, CEAR Ref. Nr.
10-01-53859; Expansion of an Aquaculture Operation in Campobello, New Brunswick,
CEAR Ref. Nr. 09-01-47806; and Duck Cove, Aquaculture Site for Rearing Finfish
(Atlantic salmon), CEAR Ref. Nr. 03-01-166.
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over the consistency of the practices and decisions made.156 A clear example
thereof are the different approaches adopted to determine whether iBoF salmon is
likely to be affected by a project, an aspect that SARA has left to a judgment call
by the Responsible Authority.157 In some of the reviewed cases, Atlantic salmon
was not identified as a species to be included in the assessment because, according
to the Atlantic Canada Conservation Data Center (ACCDC), it was not present in
the project area or within a five kilometers buffer zone.158 In two cases, the
ACCDC was not the only source of information used to assess the potential presence of the species in the area.159 In one of these cases, however, the regulatory
authority considered that, despite its potential presence in the area, this endangered
species was not a valuable ecosystem component potentially impacted by the project.160 This decision was made on the basis that the proposed project area did not
provide critical or limiting habitat for the species, an analysis that disregarded other
impacts of the project on wild endangered populations. Only in one of the reviewed
cases was endangered Atlantic salmon identified as a valuable ecosystem component, and the impacts of the project on these populations particularly considered in
the assessment.161
A further concern is the fact that existing legislative provisions and policy
guidelines do not consistently and clearly address the implementation of the precautionary approach, a matter of particular importance for Atlantic salmon considering the uncertainties surrounding the low marine survival and the main threats to
recovery. Both SARA and CEAA consider the precautionary approach as a guiding
principle for their implementation, but they consider different standards for the
measures required. While CEAA considers a stronger version of precaution in the
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SARA, ss. 79(1) and (2) require the responsible authority to: a) notify the competent
Minister if the project is likely to affect a listed wildlife species or its critical habitat; b)
identify the adverse effects of the project on the listed wildlife species and its critical
habitat; c) ensure that measures are taken to avoid or lessen those effects; and d) monitor those effects.
VanderZwaag & Hutchings, supra note 25 at 236.
See: Bliss Harbour Aquaculture Lease, CEAR 10-01-54205; Campobello Aquaculture
Operation, CEAR 09-01-47806, and Duck Cove Aquaculture Site, CEAR 03-01-166.
According to the screening reports, the five kilometers buffer zone is a standard practice of the Atlantic Canada Conservation Data Center (ACCDC), the database used for
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guidelines for environmental assessment of marine finfish aquaculture projects, including: L.I. Doucette and B. Hargrave, A Guide to the Decision Support System for Environmental Assessment of Marine Finfish Aquaculture, Can. Tech. Rep. Fish. Aquat.
Sci. 2426 (Dartmouth, NS: Fisheries and Oceans, 2002); and Fisheries and Oceans
Canada, Interim Guide to Information Requirements for Environmental Assessment of
Marine Finfish Aquaculture Projects (February 15, 2002). See also B.T. Hargrave, “A
traffic light decision system for marine finfish aquaculture siting” (2002) 45 Ocean &
Coastal Management 215.
See Aquaculture Site St. Mary’s Bay, CEAR 10-01-55946; and Aquaculture Site Bliss
Harbour, CEAR 10-01-53859.
See Aquaculture Site Bliss Harbour, CEAR 10-01-53859.
See Aquaculture Site St. Mary’s Bay, CEAR 10-01-55946.
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purpose section of the Act that may lead even to prohibition of certain activities by
the federal government,162 SARA considers a weaker version that rests on costeffective measures to prevent the reduction or loss of species even when there is
lack of full scientific certainty.163 Section 79, in turn, does not prohibit any adverse
effect on species at risk but just seeks to identify, avoid or lessen them, at the discretion of the regulatory authority.
The SARA-CEAA policy document, Addressing Species at Risk Act Considerations under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act: A federal policy and
procedures guide, reiterates the need to adopt a precautionary approach in cases of
uncertainty in the analysis.164 This document does not specify what is required
under a precautionary approach, but makes a reference to a further policy document, Environmental Assessment Best Practice Guide for Wildlife at Risk in Canada.165 Guideline 10 of the Best Practice Guide requires applying “the precautionary approach/principle when making decisions concerning significance of effects
on wildlife species at risk,”166 specifying what the application of the precautionary
approach entails and including an explicit reverse onus of proof.167 This strong
version of precautionary approach as applied to wildlife at risk is consistent with
international guidelines.168 However, these policies have been developed by the
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CEAA, ss. 4(1)(a) and 4(2).
SARA, preamble para. 5 and s. 38.
SARA-CEAA Guidance Working Group, Addressing Species at Risk Act Considerations under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act: A federal policy and procedures guide (Final Draft, August 2005), at 35, online: Canadian Environmental Network <http://www.cen-rce.org/eng/caucuses/assessment/index.html>.
Canadian Wildlife Service and Environment Canada, Environmental Assessment Best
Practice Guide for Wildlife at Risk in Canada, 1st ed., February 2004, online: Environment
Canada
<http://www.ec.gc.ca/Publications/default.asp?lang=En&xml=5407909E-10F6-4AFEACDF-75B9E820B4A1>.
Ibid. at 24–26.
The best practices, in this subject, state that: “The onus of proof should be on the proponent to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the decision-maker that adverse effects on
wildlife at risk or biological diversity are not significant” (ibid. at 25).
IUCN, Guidelines for Applying the Precautionary Principle to Biodiversity Conservation and Natural Resource Management, approved by the 67th meeting of the IUCN
Council,
14–16
May
2007,
online:
IUCN
<http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/ln250507_ppguidelines.pdf>. See, in particular,
Guideline 8 (Allocate roles and responsibilities for providing information and evidence
of potential threat and/or safety according to who is proposing a potentially harmful
activity, who benefits from it and who has access to information and resources), and
Guideline 12, on Adaptive Management, which states that applying the precautionary
principle may sometimes require strict prohibition of activities, which is particular pertinent in situations where particular vulnerable species or ecosystem are concerned.
NASCO, in turn, also considers a strong version of burden of proof in particular with
respect to aquaculture activities that may have significant adverse impact on wild
salmon stocks (NASCO, Resolution by the Parties to the Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean to Minimize Impacts from Aquaculture,
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Minister responsible for Environment Canada and Parks Canada, while DFO has
not developed equivalent guidelines.
Various options exist for bolstering federal environmental assessment law and
policy. Key options include amending CEAA to require assessment of projects
which may significantly impact aquatic species at risk,169 and amending the Comprehensive Study List Regulations to mandate a higher level of scrutiny for such
projects. On the policy side, an explicit cross-reference in the iBoF Salmon Strategy to the precautionary approach included in the Policy for the Conservation of
Wild Atlantic Salmon could be made.170 This Policy states that the implementation
of its objectives “must and will be” consistent with the precautionary approach and
provides guidance for its implementation, including a reversal of the burden of
proof. Further, specific and comprehensive guidance for the assessment of projects
in the Bay of Fundy could be developed. This recommendation was considered
among the measures directed to mitigate threats to iBoF salmon in the Recovery
Potential Assessment,171 but the Strategy remained silent on this matter.

(ii) Enhancing Provincial Engagement in Aquatic Endangered Species
Protection
Provinces exercise legislative jurisdiction over a series of topic areas that directly or indirectly affect aquatic species, many of which have been included as
threats for iBoF Atlantic salmon. They include: land use, riparian rights associated
with water quantity and water quality, forest management, mining, aquaculture development, agriculture, and highway and infrastructure development.172 For this
reason, the participation of the two provinces within the range of distribution of
iBoF Atlantic salmon, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, is necessary for the effective implementation of measures to protect and recover the species at risk. The
Recovery Strategy recognizes the importance of the commitment and cooperation
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Introductions and Transfers, and Transgenic in the Wild Salmon Stocks (the Williamsburg Resolution), CNL(06)48 (adopted 2003 and amended in 2004 and 2006), online:
NASCO <http://www.nasco.int/pdf/agreements/williamsburg.pdf>), and for the
projects having an impact on salmon habitat (NASCO, Plan of Action for the Application of the Precautionary Approach to the Protection and Restoration of Atlantic
Salmon
Habitat,
CNL(01)51,
online:
NASCO
<http://www.nasco.int/pdf/agreements/habitatplan.pdf>). However, the strength of
these NASCO documents is low, as discussed further below.
For a related suggestion, namely to amend CEAA to require federal environmental assessment of projects likely to significantly impact designated federal environmental
priorities, particularly climate change, see Stephen Hazell, “Improving the Effectiveness of Environmental Assessment in Addressing Federal Environmental Priorities”
(2010) 24 J.E.L.P. 213.
Supra note 142.
This document recommends to “enhance and formalize the risk-based management approach for review of development proposals in and around iBoF habitat pursuant to the
habitat Provisions of the Fisheries Act, SARA and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act” (Recovery Potential Assessment, supra note 15 at 23).
Recovery Strategy, supra note 1 at 11.
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of different constituencies, including provincial governments.173 However, it seems
that the potential for meaningful cooperation and complementary action towards
iBoF Atlantic salmon conservation and recovery is not being fully realized.
A first element of concern is the limited representation of provincial governments in the iBoF Atlantic salmon recovery team. Between 2005 and 2010, only
seven representatives of the provincial governments attended the Recovery Team
meetings. Never were there more than two representatives at the same time, while
in one meeting none was present.174 In contrast, no less than 15 and up to 22 Fisheries and Oceans staff members were present at any given Recovery Team meeting.
The Recovery Team has had a marked preeminence of federal government, and
particularly Fisheries and Oceans, representatives.
A second concern is that the Strategy does not highlight the role of provincial
governments in addressing specific threats to iBoF Atlantic salmon, which likely is
a consequence of the lack of specific management approaches in the Strategy, as
analyzed previously. The roles of the provinces are not delineated, and only a general reference to the involvement of “government,” along with non-governmental
and conservation organizations, other stakeholders and the general public, is included as an approach of the fifth, and less important, recovery objective of communicating and increasing the general awareness of the status and recovery of iBoF
salmon.175
Perhaps provincial roles might be further clarified at the action planning stage.
Issues to be considered include the adequacy of existing provincial coastal management planning frameworks176 and whether iBoF salmon should be listed under the
provincial endangered species legislation.

(iii) Ensuring Full Implementation of Canada’s Ocean Act
Canada’s Ocean’s Act,177 passed in 1996 and entering into force on 31 January 1997, holds potentials to help protect wild Atlantic salmon. The Act requires
the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to lead the development and implementation
of integrated management plans for Canada’s coastal and marine waters178 and
management plans could eventually assist salmon in various ways, for example,
placing protection of SARA-listed populations as a high planning priority and helping to identify critical marine habitats.179 The Act also requires the Minister of
Fisheries and Oceans to lead the development and implementation of a national
173
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Ibid. at v.
Attendance to meetings varied between 29 and 36 persons.
Recovery Strategy, supra note 1 at 34. The five objectives included in the Strategy are
prioritized (ibid. at 32).
See, for example, Joint Review Panel Report on the Proposed Whites Point Quarry and
Marine Terminal Project (October 2007), Recommendation 2 at 103-104, online: Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency <www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca>.
Supra note 21.
Ibid., s. 31.
The Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Ocean Management Plan, while not specifically
addressing at risk Atlantic salmon, explicitly notes the importance of protecting species
at risk through management planning and the potential for identifying critical habitats.
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system of marine protected areas.180 One of the main justifications for establishing
an MPA pursuant to the Oceans Act is to conserve and protect endangered or
threatened marine species and their habitats.181
As various publications have emphasized, Canada has been lagging in moving
from paper rhetoric to practical implementation.182 Only eight MPAs have been
established to date under the Oceans Act,183 and of the five in Atlantic Canada,
only one is located in the Bay of Fundy region, the Mushquash Estuary MPA in
New Brunswick.184 Integrated management planning has largely focused on five
Large Ocean Management Areas (LOMAs)185 with coastal area planning being exceedingly limited.186 The Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated Oceans Management
process has chosen to exclude the 12 n.m. territorial sea and the plan has yet to be
formally endorsed by the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans.187 No coastal management areas (CMAs) have been established in the Bay of Fundy Region although an
integrated management planning process has been extended to a coastal area in
Southwest New Brunswick.188 In March 2011, Canada and Nova Scotia signed a
Memorandum of Understanding which promises to enhance cooperation in integrated coastal and ocean management planning in various regions, including the
Bay of Fundy/Gulf of Maine.189
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The Plan is available online: Fisheries and Oceans Maritime Region
<http://www.mar.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/e0010316>.
Oceans Act, s. 35(2).
Ibid., s. 35(1)(b).
See e.g. Sabine Jessen, “A Review of Canada’s Implementation of the Oceans Act
since 1997 — From Leader to Follower?” (2011) 39 Coastal Mgmt. 20 and Peter J.
Ricketz & Lawrence Hildebrand, “Coastal and Ocean Management in Canada: Progress or Paralysis?” (2011) 39 Coastal Mgmt. 4.
Designated MPAs include: the Endeavour Hydrothermal Vents and Bowie Seamount in
British Columbia; the Gully submarine canyon in Nova Scotia; Basin Head in Prince
Edward Island; the Mushquash Estuary in New Brunswick; Eastport in Newfoundland;
Gilbert Bay in Labrador; and Tarium Niryutait in the Arctic. See Fisheries and Oceans
Canada,
Marine
Protected
Areas,
online:
<http://www.dfompo.gc.ca/oceans/marineareas-zonesmarines/mpa-zpm/index-eng.htm>.
Mushquash Estuary Marine Protected Area Regulations, SOR/2006-354.
The five priority planning areas include: Placentia Bay and the Grand Banks, the Scotian Shelf, the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the Beaufort Sea and the Pacific North Coast. See
Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Canada’s Oceans Action Plan: For Present and Future
Generations (2005) at 13–15.
For a review of the limitations and challenges, see: Fisheries and Oceans, Proceedings
of the Federal-Provincial-Territorial Coastal Management Areas Workshop, 16-17
May 2007, DFO. Can. Sci. Advis. Sec. Proceed. Ser. 2007/025 (Ottawa: Fisheries and
Oceans, 2007).
See Jensen, supra note 182 at 39-40.
For publications and initiatives surrounding the Southwest New Brunswick Marine Resources Planning process, see online: <http://www.bofmrp.ca>.
Memorandum of Understanding Between Canada and Nova Scotia Respecting Coastal
and Oceans Management in Nova Scotia, Mach 23, 2011, available online: Government of Nova Scotia <http://www.gov.ns.ca/coast/consultation-mou.htm>.
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(iv) Charting Future Directions for the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation
Organization (NASCO)
NASCO, established in 1984 as a regional forum to foster regional cooperation in conserving wild salmon stocks in the North Atlantic Ocean,190 includes
Canada as a Party191 but the effectiveness of NASCO has been limited on numerous fronts.192 Being highly restricted in its regulatory powers, NASCO has had to
rely largely on voluntary guidelines and codes to address the multiple threats facing
wild salmon.193 Key non-mandatory documents include: Agreement on Adoption
of a Precautionary Approach (1998);194 Action Plan for Application of the Precautionary Approach (1999);195 the Williamsburg Resolution to Minimize Impacts
from Aquaculture, Introductions and Transfers, and Transgenics on the Wild
Salmon Stocks (2003, as amended in June 2004 and June 2006);196 NASCO Plan
of Action for the Application of the Precautionary Approach to the Protection and
Restoration of Atlantic Salmon Habitat (2001);197 NASCO Guidelines for the Management of Salmon Fisheries;198 Guidance on Best Management Practices to Address Impacts of Sea Lice and Escaped Farmed Salmon on Wild Salmon Stocks
(2009);199 and NASCO Guidelines for the Protection, Restoration and Enhance-
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Pursuant to the Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic
Ocean, 2 March 1982, 1338 UNTS 33, C.T.S. 1983/11.
Parties include, besides Canada, Denmark (in respect of Greenland and the Faroe Islands), the European Union, Norway, the Russian Federation and the United States of
America. “About NASCO”, online NASCO <http://www.nasco.int/about.html> (accessed 16 February 2011).
For recent critique, see David L. VanderZwaag & Emily J. Pudden, “The North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization (NASCO): Surpassing a 25 Year Voyage in
Transboundary Cooperation but Still Confronting a Sea of Challenges” in Dawn A.
Russell & David L. VanderZwaag, eds., Recasting Transboundary Fisheries Management Arrangements in Light of Sustainability Principles: Canadian and International
Perspectives (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) 307.
Regulatory constraints include a requirement for unanimous agreement among voting
members of regional commissions (North American, North-East Atlantic and West
Greenland) before regulatory measures can be imposed and the option for parties to opt
out of proposed regulatory measures. See ibid. at 310-11.
NASCO, Agreement on Adoption of a Precautionary Approach, CNL(98)46, online:
NASCO <http://www.nasco.int/pa_agreement.html>.
NASCO, Action Plan for the Application of the Precautionary Approach, CNL(99)48,
Annex 11 of NASCO, Report of the Sixteenth Annual Meeting of the Council (1999).
NASCO, CNL(06)48, supra note 168.
NASCO, CNL(01)51, supra note 168.
NASCO, Guidelines for the Management of Salmon Fisheries, CNL(09)43, online:
NASCO <http://www.nasco.int/fisheries.html>.
NASCO, Guidance on Best Management Practices to address impacts of sea lice and
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revised
in
June
2010),
online:
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ment of Atlantic Salmon Habitat (2010).200 The Williamsburg Resolution contains
various guidance documents as annexes including Guidelines on Containment of
Farm Salmon,201 Guidelines for Stocking Atlantic Salmon,202 and Guidelines for
Action on Transgenic Salmonids.203
In an attempt to facilitate transparency and accountability in how NASCO parties are faring in implementing their numerous conservation commitments, NASCO
has required parties to develop overall implementation plans204 and to prepare annual reports on one of the three focus areas set out in the implementation plans.
Focus Area Reports (FARs) on fisheries management were submitted by parties in
2008, salmon habitat reports in 2009, and aquaculture and associated activities reports in 2010.205 The FARs have been subject to critical analysis by Review
Groups involving both governmental and NGO representation.206
While useful, the focus area reporting process has been criticized regarding
the high level of generality in many reports and the lack clarity in implementation
actions. For example, the final report of the Ad Hoc Review Group on Protection,
Restoration and Enhancement of Salmon Habitat lamented over how most FARs
failed to address in any detail on how biological factors, such as invasive species,
poor water quality, aquaculture-related diseases and parasites, might affect the productive capacity of salmon and highlighted how many FARs, including Canada’s,
failed to clarify how the burden of proof is placed on proponents of activities having potential to impact salmon habitat.207 The draft report of the Aquaculture, Introductions and Transfers and Transgenics Focus Area Review Group noted that
few FARS give information on international cooperation initiatives urged by the
Williamsburg Resolution to minimize aquaculture impacts on wild stocks. The Review Group further concluded that no jurisdiction was able to show attainment of
international goals, specifically 100 per cent containment of farmed salmon and
100 per cent of farms to have effective sea lice management such that there is no
increase in sea lice loads or lice-induced mortality of wild salmonids attributable to
the farms.208
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Perhaps one of the greatest NASCO challenges has been to ensure precautionary regulatory measures for the taking of North American salmon in other jurisdictions.209 While NASCO has restricted salmon fishing off West Greenland to an
internal-use only catch,210 harvests have still been quite substantial with 26 tonnes
reportedly taken in 2009 in addition to an estimated 10 tonne unreported catch.211
NASCO has not been able to convince France to become a party on behalf of St.
Pierre and Miquelon212 and thus the salmon fishery there continues beyond
NASCO’s regulatory purview.213
NASCO continues to struggle with limited scientific information and understanding. While a major research program, Salmon at Sea (SALSEA), was initiated
in 2004 to study the migration and distribution of salmon at sea, the reasons for
high marine mortality of salmon remain uncertain.214 Climate change impacts on
wild salmon are still not well understood.215 Little scientific information exists regarding how renewable energy technologies, such as tidal, wave and wind projects,
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salmon fishery of 3.464 tonnes, the second highest in the ten-year time series. See
NASCO, Information from the French Authorities on the St. Pierre and Miquelon
Salmon Fishery, CNL(10)34, Annex 23 of Report of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the Council, ibid.
For the latest review of the SALSEA Programme, see NASCO, Report of the Ninth
Meeting of the International Atlantic Salmon Research Board, CNL(10)9, online:
NASCO <http://www.nasco.int/sas/reports.htm>. Canada has specifically noted the
many question marks SALSEA research still leaves regarding reasons why salmon return in smaller numbers every year. See Opening Statement Made by Canada in Report
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For a report describing trends in sea temperature and salinity changes in the North
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may directly or indirectly affect the survival and behavior of Atlantic salmon.216
In light of the endangered status of not only iBoF salmon stocks but other
populations as well,217 Canada will likely face increasing pressures to confront difficult questions regarding the future of NASCO. Should the NASCO convention be
modernized to reflect key sustainability principles, such as precaution and the
ecosystem approach?218 Is it politically feasible to expand the regulatory functions
of NASCO? Might at least some of the existing guidelines be strengthened and
made mandatory? How might national reporting and accountability be further
bolstered?
NASCO itself has set in motion review processes where future directives will
be explored. At the 2010 Annual Meeting, NASCO’s Council agreed to establish a
‘Next Steps’ Review Group to further assess implementation efforts, to review the
reporting and evaluation process, to identify any additional areas that might need to
be addressed so NASCO can meet the management challenges, and to develop proposals for an external review.219 The Council has also committed to establish a
panel of external experts to undertake a further performance review of NASCO
with the terms of reference to be agreed upon at the 2011 Annual Meeting of
NASCO.220

5. CONCLUSION
While SARA offers a cascade of promises for the protection of marine species
at risk, this Atlantic salmon case study demonstrates the limitations to date in implementation practice. Trickles of protection rather than a “steady flow” of protective currents seem evident with the considerable generality of the Recovery Strategy for endangered iBoF Salmon, the limited identification of critical habitat, the
failure to clearly extend legal protection to critical habitat, and the foggy future left
as to the timing and content of action plans.
Protection of aquatic species at risk is a challenging task. SARA has undoubtedly more powerful effects on aquatic species than on terrestrial species, with
prohibitions on individuals and residences applying automatically after listing in
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the whole range of their distribution, and critical habitat protection required 180
days after identification. Additionally, the limited scientific data and understanding
of ecosystem inter-relationships and critical marine habitats stand out as one of the
most daunting challenges and represent a common constraint in living marine resources management.221
Perhaps the greatest lesson to be learned from the Canadian Atlantic salmon at
risk story is the lack of “simple fixes” with a complex array of challenges needing
to be addressed. Key challenges within the SARA seascape include: forging a clear
agenda for recovery actions; confronting limitations in incidental harm permitting
and authorizations; strengthening protection of critical habitat; and sorting out the
possible listing of additional Atlantic salmon populations under SARA and the relationship with iBoF recovery planning and action.
Strengthening protective nets outside SARA also seems crucial with this article highlighting the need to consider: bolstering environmental impact assessment
in relation to the protection of wild Atlantic salmon; enhancing the participation
and actions of provinces, possibly by invoking application of their endangered species legislation to salmon; ensuring full implementation of the integrated planning
and marine protected area responsibilities set out in Canada’s Ocean Act; and charting future directions for enhancing the effectiveness of NASCO.
While some of these challenges may be partly met through regulatory followthrough under SARA222 and more dedicated implementation efforts, at least five
challenging limitations cry out for legislative amendment consideration. Legislative
reform priorities include the need to: curb political discretion in the SARA listing
process;223 flesh out the procedure and process for developing recovery strategies;224 establish statutory timelines for the development and issuance of action
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223 Similar amendment suggestions have been put forward by Ecojustice, David Suzuki
Foundation and Nature Canada (House of Commons, Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development, 40th Parliament, 3d Session, Evidence of Meeting
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224 Procedural and substantive amendments to the recovery strategy and action plan stage
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plans;225 impose a procedural check or checks on issuance of incidental harm permits and authorizations;226 and restrict the discretion to exempt activities from
SARA’s prohibitions and incidental harm permitting through recovery strategy
statements.227
An aspect pervasive to the implementation of SARA has been the discretion
left to the competent Ministers in some key aspects of the recovery process, a discretion that often cedes in favor of economic and social interests. It seems apparent
from this article and from the broader review of SARA that the balance between
required flexibility and the spirit of SARA to establish a prescriptive protection for
species at risk is an area that still needs to be worked out. An issue warranting
further public and political debate is the appropriateness of the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans serving as the competent Minister for protecting aquatic species
under SARA. The Minister continues to face potentially conflicting mandates, to
effectively protect species at risk while at the same time being responsible for managing commercial fisheries and promoting and managing aquaculture
development.228
Saving Atlantic salmon populations will need much more than law reforms
and better law and policy implementation. As the article in this volume by David
Suzuki eloquently highlights, the philosophical vision of salmon as sacred needs to
infiltrate political, public and bureaucratic attitudes. The observation of
VanderZwaag and Hutchings, made soon after SARA entered into force, still rings
true: “Society as a whole has to move from a ‘deathbed’ approach to conservation
towards ‘holistic health’ were humans live within the bounds of ecological integrity
and biodiversity richness.”229
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